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III. THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING
PROCESS-THE REPORTERS SPEAK
MAKING RULES TO DISPOSE OF
MANIFESTLY UNFOUNDED ASSERTIONS:





The late Robert Cover questioned the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure thus:
It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural
needs of a complex antitrust action, a simple automobile neg-
ligence case, a hard-fought school integration suit, and an
environmental class action to restrain the building of a pipe-
line are sufficiently identical to be usefully encompassed in a
single set of rules which makes virtually no distinctions
among such cases in terms of available process.'
Professor Cover continued. He suggested that the Rules might usefully
forsake their "trans-substantive" 2 character in order to give more effec-
tive service to substantive rights. Professor Cover's questioning pro-
t Harry R. Chadwick, Sr. Professor of Law, Duke University; Reporter, Advi-
sory Committee on the Civil Rules. This Article, especially the draft provided in the
Appendix, is the product of efforts by many Committee members and correspondents.
Their number precludes the possibility of recognition here. Eight persons have, how-
ever, commented on an earlier draft of the Article with zeal that has been especially
helpful and must be acknowledged. They are Stephen Burbank, Kevin Clermont, Ed-
ward Cooper, Martin Louis, Richard Marcus, Judith Resnik, Maurice Rosenberg,
Thomas Rowe, and Alvin Rubin. Also very useful were the comments of Benjamin
Kaplan and Albert M. Sacks made at the Conference. I also acknowledge the assistance
of Marc Olson, University of California Law School Class of 1990. Earlier work on
this subject was supported by the E.T. Bost Fund at the Duke University School of
Law.
I Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718, 732-33 (1975) (citation omitted).
2 Id. at 733.
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ceeded from a larger skepticism about the possibility of political neu-
trality of public institutions.' His vision has been echoed by other
skeptics in the years since his writing,4 but it has never been "trans-
substantiated" 5 as a draft of procedure rules that might be considered
as an alternative to the "trans-substantive" rules sometimes decried. It
has survived as a ghost in the darkness surrounding academic discus-
sions of the future of civil procedure.
This Article aims to test Professor Cover's vision against the major
problem of contemporary procedural rulemaking. It concludes that ju-
dicially-made rules directing courts to proceed differently according to
the substantive nature of the rights enforced is an idea that has been
wisely rejected in the past and must be rejected for the present and for
the future.
Professor Cover is, of course, on high ground in pointing to the
seamlessness of the relationship between substance and procedure. The
difficulty associated with the maintenance of the distinction between
substance and procedure has long been familiar6 and is not questioned
here. Nevertheless, the difference is not meaningless, and I have else-
where attempted to contribute to our understanding of those terms as
they are used in the Rules Enabling Act.7 It is necessary to find mean-
ing for them in part because Professor Cover's prescription is untena-
ble, as this Article will attempt to demonstrate.
There are and will continue to be many significant variations in
the uses made of procedure rules in different kinds of cases, including
' "History and literature cannot escape their location in a normative universe, nor
can prescription, even when embodied in a legal text, escape its origin and its end in
experience, in the narratives that are the trajectories plotted upon material reality by
our imaginations." Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, The Supreme Court -
1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 5 (1983) (citations omitted); cf. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1101 (1982) (declaring "historical
... perspective [to be] essential to an understanding of the circumstances from which
the language of the [Rules Enabling] Act drew much of its meaning").
" See Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 696-97 (1988); Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 494, 547-48 (1986); Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in His-
torical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 985 (1987).
' Transubstantiation is the doctrine that at the sacrament of communion the wine
and bread of the Eucharist are turned into the substance of Christ himself. See THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1365 (W. Morris
ed. 1979).
1 See generally Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE L.J. 333, 333-34 (1933) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing substance
from procedure in the area of conflicts of laws).
7 See Carrington, The Rules Enabling Act of 1988: Original Sin Resisted, 1989
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming) (arguing that the temptation to view the four substance/pro-
cedure lines drawn in the Rules Enabling act as a constant must be resisted).
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some noncontroversial accommodations to differences in the substantive
natures of matters in dispute. New differentiations in procedure may be
needed now and perhaps should be considered by civil rulemakers in
the near future. But judicially-made procedure rules aiming to effect
particular substantive outcomes are not viable, It will be a useful con-
tribution to discussions of procedural reforms if that approach, sug-
gested by Professor Cover, can be laid to rest.
Two matters will be considered to test the vision of non-trans-
substantive procedure. One is the rulemaking process, its benefits and
its limitations. Critical analysis of the existing process8 shows that it is
ill-suited to resolving political contests between competing groups who
seek at the expense of their adversaries to advance their short-term in-
terests in litigation outcomes. Process is therefore not competent to
make rules intended to give particular advantages to, say, antitrust
plaintiffs against antitrust defendants or vice versa.
All procedural systems share the second problem at all times: they
must confront manifestly unfounded contention. To illuminate this
ubiquitous problem, this Article will suggest a revision of Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Advocates of a non-trans-sub-
stantive approach of civil litigation are here challenged to suggest varia-
tions in the rule that would be especially appropriate to a category of
cases defined by the substantive rights to be enforced. This presentation
concludes that substantively-based variations are not likely to be useful
even if a process to draft and promulgate such rules could be devised.
II. RULEMAKING
A. Assessing the Product, 1938-1988
To appraise a process that has been in place for fifty years, we
must assign a value to the product of that process. The correct question
is: Are the Rules themselves a success or failure?
No knowledgeable person would claim the Civil Rules have
achieved Rule l's elusive aim "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action." There are many shortfalls in per-
formance, especially in the pursuit of "inexpensive" determinations.9
To some extent, these shortfalls arise from the Civil Rules' failure to
I The present process has evolved to include some of the steps here described such
as open meetings and hearings. Open meetings are now required by the Rules Ena-
bling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648, 4649 (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2073).
9 See Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 997-1001
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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deal effectively with the problem of unfounded contentions. The second
half of this article discusses this subject.
Deficiencies in contemporary civil procedure notwithstanding, I
view fifty years of federal civil rulemaking as a success. The aim of
rulemaking to achieve the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action" is not fully attainable. Generic problems faced by any
procedural system are enduring and intractable. Not only is perfection
impossible, but even excellence is unstable, especially so in a system
dependent on the adversary tradition, because of changing circum-
stances and the corrosive effect of perpetual exploration and exploita-
tion of systemic weakness by adversaries.
One cause of dissatisfaction with contemporary federal practice is
the elevation of our expectations relative to possibility. Our desire for
"just" results requires dispositions based on truth insofar as we can
know the truth of past events. There is an ever-increasing supply of
available information bearing on past events, and perhaps an increasing
supply of wisdom in the management of that information. Neither,
however, is costless, and their relative costs may be rising.
Some of the expense of our system of litigation is related indirectly
to the right to jury trial in civil cases. With jury trial as a paradigm, we
are committed to the trial as a discrete and dramatic event rather than
a series of interviews conducted over an extended period, as some sys-
tems allow.'0 The dramatic trial, in turn, creates the problem of sur-
prise and the need for pretrial discovery." Given the deep inculturation
of the jury as well as its constitutional stature, 2 the Federal Civil
Rules must proceed with these conditions, even if at times they may
contribute to delay and cost.
Governments simpler than our own, in places where less is ex-
pected of the civil judicial process, are likely to use less expensive pro-
cedural systems.'" Most legal systems regard civil procedure only as a
1" See Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 826 (1985) (describing the German trial as "not a single continuous event"
but rather as "the court gather[ing] and evaluat[ing] evidence over a series of hear-
ings"); ef. B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE 209 (1968) ("It has
been suggested that, instead of being scheduled as single events, trials could be broken
down into component parts. . . . This system. . . would. . . avoid the psychological
trauma of the one-shot battle . . ").
"1 See Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in Federal Practice, 7 VAND. L.
REV. 576, 580 (1954) ("[T]he element of surprise sometimes frustrates the ends of
justice."); see also Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE
L.J. 863, 863 (1933) (noting that pleadings themselves are insufficient to eliminate
surprise).
12 See generally J. GUINTHNER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988) (investigating
various aspects of the debate surrounding the jury system).
13 Cf Langbein, supra note 10, at 823-24 (describing the American civil litigation
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means of dispute resolution. Few if any other democratic legislatures
would perceive civil litigation as being also an important instrument of
social, political, and economic regulation. 4 In contrast, as Kenneth
Scott has described, our courts are engaged in "modifying behavior,"15
especially that of corporations and individuals primarily attentive to the
bottom line.
Important reasons that our Congress more often relies on civil liti-
gation as a means of law enforcement include at least two found in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 6 the discovery system established in
the 1938 Rules' 7 (a system that is truly the dread of the multi-national
enterprise) and the class action device as amended in 1966.18 If our
courts are often less speedy and more expensive, they are also more
likely to determine the reality of events in dispute than speedier and
less expensive systems. In no other country will lawyers soundly advise
citizens so frequently that engaging in conduct forbidden by national
law will likely be discovered, if not by the government, then by private
lawyers representing individuals harmed by the unlawful conduct. 9 In
addition, as a result of the suits, courts will compel violators to compen-
sate not merely a few aggressive individuals willing to invest treasure
and heartache in litigation, but everyone protected by the national law.
In this important respect, the United States Congress speaks with
greater authority and effect than other legislative bodies.
system as excessive and setting out the advantages of the German system). But cf.
Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 734, 742-48 (1987) (discussing advantages the American civil procedure system
has over the German system).
"4 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1282-84 (1976) (contrasting burgeoning public law litigation with the
traditional concept of lawsuits as "a vehicle for settling disputes between private parties
about private rights"); see also Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-
American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1004-16 (1987) (discussing the relative
litigiousness of the United States and the United Kingdom).
19 See Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938 (1975).
18 Another cause of the effectiveness of American law as an instrument of public
policy is the use of the injunction. See generally 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNC-
TIONS (2d ed. 1983). See also R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1-2 (1963):
"[t]o the lawyer from a non-common-law country the contempt power is a legal tech-
nique which is not only unnecessary to a working legal system but also violative of
basic philosophical approaches to the relations between government bodies and people."
Id. (citing Pekelis, Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies: A Comparative Study,
41 MICH. L. REV. 665, 671 (1943)).
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
18 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
19 See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669 (1986) ("Probably to a unique degree, American law
relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that in other legal
systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement agencies.").
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If Congress now was considering a new law to protect the environ-
ment, or investors, or consumers, or minorities, or managements
threatened with hostile takeovers, or any other group of constituents, it
likely would think of enforcing it through civil litigation in the federal
courts rather than through an administrative agency. The same would
not have been true in 1938,2" and the change reflects a major develop-
ment in our polity, for which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
responsible.
Moreover many state court systems have emulated the federal
rulemaking process,21 and state rulemakers have often tracked closely
the evolving federal rules.22 This phenomenon partly stems from a de-
sire for uniformity between federal and state procedures, and may
partly result from a failure of legal imagination, 3 but another factor is
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have more nearly reflected
our aspirations for judicial decision-making than have any other
schemes. As Geoffrey Hazard has put it: "The Rules may be Bleak
House, but everyone seems to want to live there."24
Seen in these lights, federal rulemaking may be appraised in gen-
erally positive terms. One may view the Rules Enabling Act of 193425
as an accommodation in our constitutional scheme, a subconstitutional
structure2" designed to increase the long term effectiveness of the fed-
20 See generally J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). James Lan-
dis, then Dean of Harvard Law School, wrote this book shortly after the beginning of
the New Deal. The work is an optimistic appraisal of the effectiveness of administra-
tive agencies in bringing about social change.
21 See A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
91-145 (1949) (reviewing the extent to which the state courts have followed through
with the ABA's recommendation that all courts "be regulated by rules of court");
McKusick, State Courts' Interest in Federal Rulemaking: A Proposal for Recognition,
36 ME. L. REV. 253, 253 (1984) ("At least thirty states, plus the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico, now have civil rules substantially identical to the federal rules.").
22 See Oakley & Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1986).
22 See A. WATSON, FAILURES OF THE LEGAL IMAGINATION xiii-xiv (1988).
24 Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1287 (1978) (citing
Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D.
199 (1976)).
2 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064.
26 For a suggestion that rulemaking is an inherent constitutional power, see Win-
berry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 255, 74 A.2d 406, 412 (1950) (noting the inherent rule
making power of courts in holding that under New Jersey's 1947 Constitution, the
state legislature could not preempt rules proclaimed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court). For a criticism of this opinion, see Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Rela-
tion to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 234, 254 (1951) (arguing the court should not have set itself up as immune from
correction). But see Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV.




eral courts and thus indirectly of the legislative branch as well. The
consequences of rulemaking are long-term, radiate in many directions,
and relate to numerous other arrangements. While it is impossible to
say what life for the last fifty years would have been, or what the next
fifty would be, without rulemaking,27 it is not wrong to suppose that,
for all the faults it has produced in the system of litigation, the
rulemaking process has produced widely shared benefits. 2
B. The Process, 1988
The present rulemaking process bears a substantial resemblance to
the one created by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act of 1934,2" but conforms to a legislative scheme put in place as re-
cently as October, 1988.30 Since Congress's 1974 enactment of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence,3' there has been controversy3 2 regarding the
process. Some observers have gone so far as to describe a counter-
revolution against rulemaking.33 To some extent, criticism of court
rulemaking and advocacy of change in the process34 may reflect mis-
perception of the process and forgetfulness of the vices which that pro-
cess aimed to correct. Appendix 2 to this Article sets out this insider's
view of the existing process and its limitations, explicit and inherent.
It is worth noting at the outset, however, that in fifty years, the
Supreme Court has never promulgated a Civil Rules amendment that
21 But see Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half A Century, 36 ME. L.
REV. 243, 243 (1984) (addressing the problem of improving the civil litigation process).
28 See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1008 (1987) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE]; Hazard, supra
note 24, at 1287.
2 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. The history and
political context of the 1934 Act are fully described in Burbank, supra note 3.
0 Rules Enabling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648 (to be codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 2073).
31 See generally FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at § 5006
(1977) (discussing the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
2 See J. BROWN, FEDERAL RULE-MAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES v-vii
(1981); J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 8 (1977);
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27
STAN. L. REV. 673, 673 (1975); Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time
for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 579 (1975).
22 See Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment
on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV.
35, 35 (1988).
24 See Rules Enabling Act of 1985, H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(proposing legislation to revise the process by which rules of procedure used in federal
judicial proceedings become effective); Kastenmeier & Remington, A Judicious Legisla-
tor's Lexicon to the Federal Judiciary, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTI-
TUTIONAL COMITY 54, 70-71 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988) (noting attempts to pass legisla-
tion to reform the rule making process).
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the recommending committees expected would evoke organized political
opposition. In fact, political activity by any group identified by a shared
interest external to the process has been scarce. The organized political
opposition in 1982 was limited to the professional organization of pro-
cess servers. 35 This scarcity of conventional interest-group politics in
rulemaking is not accidental.
C. Political Neutrality, A Goal in Rulemaking
Neutrality with respect to the interests of particular groups of dis-
putants is an obvious objective, indeed perhaps a paramount value, of
any enterprise engaged in dispute resolution.36 It is perhaps more criti-
cal in other facets of the procedural system, such as the selection of
judges or jurors. Article III of the Constitution reflects this point in its
provision for appointment of judges "during good Behaviour. '3 7 It is an
important value as well for the process that makes the rules which
guide the resolution of disputes.
We are not likely to perfect neutrality in the rulemaking process
or in the procedure rules themselves, any more than in other human
institutions, and there should be no pretense that we have. There are,
however, several reasons for continuing to pursue that ideal.
Procedure rules that are, or are even seen to be, designed to favor
one set of litigants produce outcomes that are less acceptable to their
adversaries. In the larger and most traditional senses of the phrase,
Equal Protection of the Law 8 requires a "level playing field" in legal
dispute resolution.
Moreover, if the procedure rules were the result of a test of
strength among political organizations, it is obvious, at least in our po-
litical system, that rules would generally favor those litigants with the
greater resources, especially those identifiable "repeat players"39 who
36 The story is told in Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and
Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1197-
1212 (1987).
31 See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353,
365 (1978) (stating that judges must be impartial).
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour. . . ."). See R. WHEELER & A.
LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1979) (stat-
ing that federal and state courts "seek to assure both the real and apparent indepen-
dence of the judiciary to decide cases without extraneous pressure").
1s See P. PoLYvIou, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 1-5, 31 (1980)
(suggesting that, while the language of the equal protection clause conveys notions of
equality before the law, equal protection and equality before the law are conceptually
distinct).
11 See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
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have the larger stakes in procedure rules and hence the greater political
energy. Procedural neutrality over the longer term corrects the political
weakness of individuals whose rights are idiosyncratic or episodic and
hence not organizable.
Also likely to be effective in a context of political organization are
those groups having interests that are internal to the procedural system.
The 1982 efforts of the organized process servers40 stand as an exam-
ple. There may be others.41 While such interest groups may have be-
nign motives and sound judgment, their organized influence is over
time likely to result in rules that serve the convenience of the profes-
sionals with the greatest stakes in the system. There may in fact be
considerable experience in England, the United States, and elsewhere
to confirm this fear. Rulemaking, too, it must be conceded, can be sub-
ject to this vice in its inevitable tendency to protect the interests of
judges.
For these reasons, the 1934 Rules Enabling Act expressed the as-
piration for political neutrality in rulemaking. This aspiration under-
lies the Act's selection of the Supreme Court as the authority to pro-
mulgate rules. In conferring this responsibility on the Court rather
than on conventional legislative committees, the Justice Department,42
or an agency for court administration, Congress followed an English
lead43 previously pursued in several states." In doing so, Congress
placed rulemaking under the institution it perceived to be least respon-
sive to interest group politics. 45 Commentators characterized this trans-
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (distinguishing those with "only
occasional recourse to the courts" from those "who are engaged in many similar litiga-
tions over time").
40 See Sinclair, supra note 35, at 1197 (noting government and private process
servers' role in formulation of Rule 4(c)).
41 Professor Hazard states that "lawyer-legislators when confronted with ques-
tions of procedure often project the opinions of that part of the bar that is seldom in
court and that therefore wants a system where relative amateurs can maintain sway."
Hazard, supra note 24, at 1293.
42 For a description of our extensive experience with the Justice Department in
such a role, see S. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91-
162 (1973). During the period immediately following adoption of the Rules Enabling
Act, the rulemaking project was conducted in the Department. See Burbank, supra
note 3, at 1133 n.530.
"' Court rulemaking was first authorized by the English Parliament in the Judi-
cature Act of 1875. See S. ROSENBAUM, THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE
ENGLISH SUPREME COURT 5-6 (1917). The American legislation was modeled on the
British.
See R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 171 (1940).
" Cf Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure - Let Congress Set the Supreme
Court Free, 73 CENT. L.J. 319, 322 (1911) (arguing that the Supreme Court should be
charged with the reform of judicial procedure, as only it could "subdue the belligerent
obstinacy that may be expected" in such an undertaking).
1989] 2075
2076 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
fer of authority to the courts to be a "first principle" of procedural law
reform." There was, indeed, active opposition to the idea of engaging
Congress itself in writing national rules of practice and procedure; that
opposition was based on experience with civil procedure provisions that
democratically elected legislators wrote in response to occasional initia-
tives of special interest groups.47
In the context of our own Constitution, it was clear that neither
the Court nor its judicial subordinates, in keeping with their role as the
Third Branch, could enact laws aiming to advance particular short-
term group interests. Judicial institutions can only enact rules framed
by reference to larger and longer-term public interest in effective courts
and procedural justice. The language of the Rules Enabling Act, re-
stricting the Court to the making of rules of procedure, not substance,
reflects the obvious corollary of the separation of powers principle."' It
is not likely that anyone even in 1934 thought that the line between
substance and procedure was a clean one,49 but it was perhaps the best
available to define a subconstitutional relationship between branches.
Because the Court can decide only "cases or controversies" and
holds no commission in the constitutional scheme to enact laws or rules
favoring or disfavoring specific groups of litigants, its role in rulemak-
ing is to shield the process from the influence of organized groups seek-
ing to shape the judicial process. Congress could not have supposed the
Court would draft rules itself and must have expected the Court would
delegate that duty to a committee of technicians. Even more than the
Court, such technicians lack any possible qualification to consider the
relative merits of competing political interests.50 The interposition of
It was also an attraction that the Supreme Court had promulgated the Federal
Equity Rules that were generally regarded as superior in their simplicity and directness
to the codes established in state legislatures. See Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the
Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 602 (1926) (comparing positive experience with the federal
equity rules with the "exceptional ineffectiveness" produced by New York's legislative
regulation of procedure).
"' See Pound, A Practical Program of Procedural Reform, 22 GREEN BAG 438,
443 (1910).
47 Cf id. at 600 (attributing faults in New York's Code of Civil Procedure to
leading New York attorneys' resistance to court rulemaking).
4' To emphasize the distinction, the Act not only authorized the making only of
rules of "practice and procedure," but also forbade the Court to make rules to "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right ... " 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982 & West Supp.
1988).
41 See Cook, supra note 6, at 336 (declaring that, for some purposes, there is no
basis for distinguishing between substantive and procedural law).
10 Proposed amendments to the Rules Enabling Act aimed to make the Advisory
Committee more "representative." See H.R. 3550, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG.
REC. H11397-98 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1985) (Rules Enabling Act of 1985) (§ 2073(a)(2)
(states that committees shall consist of "a balanced cross section of bench and bar, and
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the Judicial Conference of the United States makes little change in
that.
Rulemakers who are also judges do have, in some respects, a stake
in the rules that define their duties and are, of course, not innocent of
political preferences, but they are not advancing personal agendas.
Rulemakers who are lawyers have clients and law practices that may
have stakes in particular procedural matters. Rulemakers who are aca-
demics have intellectual commitments as well as political preferences
that may affect judgment. Yet "interests" of these kinds are substan-
tially sublimated in a group comprised of judges, lawyers, and academ-
ics who are assigned the mission of writing rules that are just. Such a
group is substantially immunized from the possibility of influence re-
sulting from direct interest or coercive pressures brought to bear by
organized groups.
Rule 1 expresses the aspiration, established by the Court, to the
rulemaking process's political neutrality.51 We can expect near univer-
sal support for the goals of justice, dispatch, and economy in litiga-
tion.52 Even "repeat players" gaining undeserved advantage from the
shortcomings of the system are not likely to express opposition to these
aims. Indeed, almost all organized groups having rights protected by
legislation prefer effective enforcement of law through civil litigation.53
The aspiration to neutrality is derived from and reinforced by the
long tradition of judicial law reform giving rise to judicial rulemaking.
That tradition descends from Roscoe Pound,
4 David Dudley Field,55
trial and appellate judges"). The "balanced cross section" language was deleted from
the bill enacted in 1988. See Rules Enabling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401,
102 Stat. 4648, 4649 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2073). The Committee is now more
diverse than it was, but representativeness in this context may be illusory.
"' See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (declaring that the Rules "govern the procedure in the
United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature").
52 But see Gross, supra note 13, at 734 ("[E]fficiency is a poor measure of the
quality of a procedural system. . . ."); Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary Sys-
tem: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in
American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 487, 489 (1980) ("Yielding to the call for swift
and certain justice without carefully scrutinizing the implications of change has under-
mined a number of procedures important to the adversary process.").
'3 Cf. W. SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY IV PART II, in COMPLETE WORKS 438,
466 (W. Craig ed. 1943) (speech of new King Henry V to the Chief Justice in final
act, in which King Henry praises the legal system that had incarcerated him as heir
apparent).
" See, e.g., Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with The Administra-
tion ofJustice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 739 (1906) (condemning "exaggerated contentious
procedure" for giving "the whole community a false notion of the purpose and end of
law").
11 See DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS CELEBRATING ONE HUN-
DRED YEARS OF LEGAL REFORM ( A. Reppy ed. 1949); Subrin, David Dudley Field
and the Field Code: An Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, LAW &
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Henry Brougham,5 6 Jeremy Bentham, 7 and unnumbered others who
have labored in pursuit of Rule l's stated aims for at least a century
and a half. Max Weber recognized this tradition of procedural law re-
form as a manifestation of the rationalization process of legal and social
institutions. He identified the phenomenon as a central feature of
Western culture linked to the advancement of its social and political
aims."
Rulemaking in this tradition must avoid the interest group politics
that is the meat and drink of the parliaments of the world. The contro-
versy over proposed amendments to Rule 68 recently illustrated this
tenderness of rulemaking.5 9 The concern of the civil rights bar,"0
whether expressed through Congress61 or directly to members of the
Civil Rules Committee, the Standing Committee, or the Judicial Con-
ference, was sufficient to cause the rulemakers to abandon the subject of
HIST. REV. 311 (1988).
58 2 SPEECHES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM 485 (1838) sets forth a flowered
version of Rule 1 uttered in Parliament on February 7, 1828, endorsing the appoint-
ment of a commission to evaluate procedure in the English courts.
17 See generally Dillon, Bentham and His School of Jurisprudence, 24 AM. L.
REV. 727 (1890) (evaluating Bentham's contributions to law reform).
11 See generally, A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 72-92 (1983) (analyzing Weber's
theory of formal legal rationality, particularly Weber's views on the irrationality of
oracular adjudication as an impetus for the rationality characteristic of Western legal
systems). Rulemaking has even been used as a measure of the process that Weber de-
scribed as the rationalization of our institutions. See T. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOP-
OLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 288 n.5 (1987).
" The first proposal for reform of Rule 68 appeared in 1983. See Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D.
337, 361-67 (1983). That proposal was made partially in response to Delta Air Lines
v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981) (holding that Rule 68 applies only to "offers made
by the defendant and only to judgments obtained by the plaintiff"). In light of the
critical response to the draft, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules tried again in the
following year. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 102 F.R.D. 407, 432-37 (1984). Hearings were conducted by the
Committee on the 1984 proposal and a number of negative reactions were recorded.
The Supreme Court made a controversial decision involving Rule 68 in Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (finding attorney's fees granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
"subject to the cost-shifting provision of Rule 68"). Legislation was offered to reverse
that decision, see H.R. 3998, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (1985). See generally Simon, The
Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1985) (discussing efforts to amend
Rule 68 and setting forth a proposed amended version).
'0 See Simon, supra note 59, at 14-19 (describing the reaction of the civil rights
bar to the 1983 and 1984 proposals to amend Rule 68)
"1 Professor Burbank attributes the withdrawal of Rule 68 proposals to Congres-
sional action. In fact, he was one of many to communicate dissatisfaction with the pro-
posals and to recommend that the Committee withdraw from its Rule 68 efforts. See
Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68 - Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MIcH. J.L.





In pursuit df political neutrality, rulemakers have generally been
mindful of the following two principles of rulemaking that serve to de-
flect political attention.
1. The Principle of Generalism
One principle, implicit in the need to avoid substantive conflict, is
that procedural rules should have general applicability. By the terms of
the Rules Enabling Act, court rules must be "general."6 Given the
opaque legislative history of the Act, the author's intention for the
word's meaning is uncertain, but given the universal relief which had
just come with the abolition of the common law forms of action 4 and
in the merger of law and equity, 5 "general" should be presumed to
mean that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not be lim-
ited in their application either to a particular geographic area6" or to a
particular subject matter of dispute.
The intellectual posture that rulemakers should strive to achieve
resembles that of John Rawls' person in the sky giving directions from
behind a veil of ignorance.67 The self-imposed ignorance of rulemakers
pertains to the identities and stakes of litigants whose claims or defenses
may be advanced specially by a proposed procedural arrangement.
Accordingly, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are seldom written
or promulgated in terms designed to operate differently according to the
substantive nature of a claim or defense. There are, to be sure, rules
specifically applicable to the representation of corporate shareholders 6
82 The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules tabled the 1984 proposal to amend
Rule 68 at its April 21, 1986 meeting without plans to consider any new proposals. See
Simon, supra note 59, at 89 n.359.
63 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (as amended by the Rules Enabling Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, §401, 102 Stat. 4648) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2073)
("The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules .... ") (em-
phasis added).
I4 See FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING
(1848). For a description of the forms of action, see F. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE
FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 293-375 (1909). There was surely no one active
in the law reform movement in the twentieth century who was not fully cognizant of
the experience with the forms.
85 See F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 302, 375 (stating that the Judicature Act
of 1873 effected the merger of equity and law).
66 Cf Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
gence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002-06 (1989)
(describing the incentives for national uniformity in procedural rules).
17 See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (describing the original
position of the rational decision-makers who choose the rules of society).
68 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1.
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suits in admiralty, 9 or proceedings in eminent domain.7 0 These rules
do not apply to litigation between individuals disputing liability for an
auto accident. Such special rules are exceptional in their limited appli-
cation. 1 No such exception has ever been made in the circumstance of
a political contest between competing adversarial groups over a proce-
dural advantage sought by one over the other.
No amendment presently under consideration gives any discernible
advantage to any substantively defined group of litigants. Correspon-
dents recently importuned the Civil Rules Committee to devise special
pleading rules in cases arising under the civil liability provisions of the
RICO Act.7 2 The suggestions reflect a high degree of dissatisfaction
with the Act and how some litigants use it.73 The committee did not
consider a rulemaking response because, perhaps among other reasons,
the suggestions would have violated the principle of generalism and
might therefore exceed the authority of the Court under the Rules Ena-
bling Act.
In Hickman v. Taylor,7 4 the Supreme Court emphasized the
generalism of the rules in explaining discovery: "Discovery . . .may
work to the disadvantage as well as to the advantage of individual
plaintiffs. Discovery, in other words, is not a one-way proposition. It is
available in all types of cases at the behest of any party, individual or
corporate, plaintiff or defendant."
'7 5
Generalism in civil procedure is, in the Anglo-American tradition,
about a century older than the Federal Rules 70 and is derived in part
11 See Supplemental Rules For Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, in 12
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at §§ 3201-56 (1973 and Supp.
1988). These were adopted in 1966. There are, of course, also separate rules governing
proceedings in bankruptcy before Bankruptcy Judges. For the origins of the present
bankruptcy rules, see generally Kennedy, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 20 PRAc. LAW.
11, 12-13 (April 1974) (summarizing the scope of the changes brought about by the
new rules).
70 See FED. R. Civ. P. 71(a).
11 In addition, some Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do have open-ended excep-
tions or qualifications, such as "when authorized by a statute of the United States."
FED. R. Civ. P. 4("). At least one rule has been interpreted to apply differently in
diversity cases than in federal question cases. See, e.g., West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35,
39 n.4 (1987) (so interpreting Rule 3). Anachronistic variations also persist in copy-
right procedure. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 409 (4th ed. 1983).
72 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
7' See Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUm. L. REV. 433, 462 (1986) (noting that "limits imposed by the
substantive law can frustrate efforts to facilitate dismissal of cases").
-7 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
75 Id. at 507.
"6 The Hilary Rules of 1836 effected this reform. They were the result of Hercu-
lean political effort by Brougham; the story is told in R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 43-46 (1952). The Hilary Rules,
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from centuries of adverse experience with substance-specific procedures.
The teaching of that adverse experience is that complexity resulting
from categorization of procedures in courts of general or broad subject
matter jurisdiction produces wasteful disputes as to which set of proce-
dural rules controls." The text of Rule 2, providing that there shall be
one cause of action, confirms that this experience was prominently in
the minds of the 1938 draftsmen. 78 This preference for simplicity af-
fords an additional, and in some minds stronger, 9 reason for the trans-
substantive nature of the Rules.
The generalist approach to rulemaking contrasts with the adminis-
trative procedures that materialized in the federal government in the
early decades of this century. Specialized agencies were, or course, a
centerpiece of the New Deal.80 The administrative law approach to
"behavior modification" linked special group interests with particular
institutional arrangements. This change appeared to yield short-term
effectiveness, but it is an approach now seldom favored because of the
likelihood that the agency and the interest group will over time unite.8"
Moreover, agencies tend to lose the posture of triadic neutrality;82 con-
cern for this loss of disinterest is one basis for our conventional expecta-
tion that important administrative action is subject to judicial review.8"
In this respect, generalism in procedure rules for Article III courts may
have constitutional roots in the fifth amendment.
2. The Principle of Flexibility
Rules drafted by the Civil Rules Committee generally bear a style
however, presumed too much on the professionalism of judges and lawyers, and they
were a fiasco: "[Niever was a more disastrous mistake made." 9 W. HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 325 (1926).
"I See Carrington, Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 34 J.
LEG. ED. 298, 302 (1984).
78 See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action.' ").
71 See, e.g., F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF AcTION AT COMMON LAw 81
(1936).
80 See J. LANDIS, supra note 20, at 14 ("Following the economic breakdown of
1929... [als rapidly as . . . causes could be isolated and problems defined, adminis-
trative agencies were created to wrestle with them.").
81 See generally Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect,
U.S. Senate, Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) (discussing the rela-
tionship between special interest groups and institutional behavior). For an account of
the development of Landis' views, see T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 153-
209 (1984).
82 See Fuller, supra note 36, at 363 (discussing adjudication as a form of social
ordering).
83 See generally 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 253-460 (2d ed.
1984) (discussing reviewable action and the scope of judicial review).
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that is related to generalism or trans-substantivity. The style is a loose
texture of meaning designed to afford flexibility in the application of
the Rules.
As a result, the committee consciously designed the 1938 Rules to
leave much to the intelligence, wisdom, and professionalism of those
who would apply them."' Often the Rules are explicit in conferring
discretion on the district judge. Sometimes the discretion or flexibility
results from diction open to interpretation; sometimes it is the product
of brevity. Despite a persistent tendency of the Rules to lengthen, 5
they nevertheless fail to address many matters of detail.
The principle of flexibility, like that'of generalism, reflects a the-
ory of procedure based on experience.8 6 Elaborate procedural principles
carefully designed to prevent judges from falling into error become
themselves centers of costly dispute tending to distract decision-making
away from substantive merits to alleged procedural miscues.8 7 Elabo-
rate procedure rigorously enforced was the tradition of the Hilary
Rules that gave us Baron Parke, who boasted that he had decided many
volumes of cases without considering their merits.88 The celebrated
Baron was clearly in the minds of the 1938 draftsmen, as was the un-
happy experience with the elaborate Throop Code of 1876 unwisely
developed by the New York legislature89 to replace the much simpler
Field Code of 1848.90 The lesson was that procedural complexity
defeats substantive rights. Over time, complexity may even liberate
84 Cf Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 659 (1971) (discussing the discretion afforded by Rule 24).
5 The 1988 Rules are half again as long as the 1938 Rules. This is a cause for
minor but persistent concern of the Civil Rules Committee.
8 Cf Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write into
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEX. L. REV. 167, 168-69 (1979) (articulating
aspects of flexibility allowed to trial courts with respect to evidence).
87 See, e.g., Cole v. Ravenshear, I K.B. 2 (1907) (dispute arising from counsel's
misinterpretation of procedural rules); J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR
RADICAL REFORM 86-90 (1969) (discussing the cumbersome nature of civil procedure);
Field, Law Reform in the United States and Its Influence Abroad, 25 AM. L. REV.
515, 529 (1891) (noting how the U.S. has suffered through lack of codification of pro-
cedure); Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Rule-making Power Granted U.S.
Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A. J. 404 (1935) (referring
to procedural complexities and technicalities as "the most prolific causes for delays and
for the multiplication of objections and exceptions").
88 See HAYES, CROGATE'S CASE: A DIALOGUE IN THE SHADES OF SPECIAL
PLEADING REFORM (U.S. ed. 1926).
89 See FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROCESS, PRACTICE, AND PLEAD-
ING IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF COMMON LAW (1912); Hornblower, Revision of
the Code, 53 ALBANY L.J. 150, 152 (1896) ("There is altogether too much minuteness
in this Code. It was built up under a microscope.").
" See C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 46-48 (2d ed.
1947) (discussing the changes wrought by the Throop Code).
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judges from a sense of personal responsibility for the substantive merits
of their decisions.
Thus, rulemakers have preferred to provide judges with simpler
tools designed to expose the merits of cases, in the hope that their pro-
fessionalism will cause the judges to use those tools to accomplish the
substantive aims established by Congress and the Constitution. In this
way, the Rules express an expectation of begetting a higher level of
judicial performance than obtains when judges are required to perform
"by the numbers." This style may reflect a longer term trend of the
sort Weber found in the Anglo-American tradition of judicial law re-
form: perspicuous observers have detected in other maturing legal sys-
tems a movement "from rigidity to flexibility." '
Four consequences of procedural flexibility deserve notice here.
One is that it facilitates categorical integration of substance and proce-
dure through court-made law.92 As courts struggle, with parties' help,
to give effective enforcement of substantive rights, procedural rules
sometimes take on subtly different contextual meanings.9 3 In this re-
spect, flexibility responds to the concerns of Professor Cover94 and pro-
vides balance to the generalism of the rules. Flexible general rules of
procedure can and do serve substance.
A second consequence of flexibility in procedure is growth of the
role of the United States Courts of Appeals. The "final decision" re-
quirement95 was adopted by the first Congress 6 and retained for pro-
ceedings in the courts of appeals when those courts were established in
1891." For at least four decades after 1938, courts of appeals exhibited
a growing tendency to find methods to review interlocutory decisions
having an important bearing on the substantive outcome of cases; gen-
erally they accomplished this by enlarging their use of the extraordi-
91 R. MILLAR, supra note 76, at 6.
92Cf. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law,
58 F.R.D. 307, 307 (1973) (advocating "circumspect consideration of the appropriate
role of the judicial institution in shaping the substantive consequences of procedures").
9' See Hazard, Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 639-44 (1988) (illustrating how procedural rules are given
different effect depending on the substance of the litigation).
4 See generally Cover, supra note 1.
95 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ("The courts of appeals .. . shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions. .... ).
96 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
97 See Act of March 3, 1891, §626 Stat. 826, 828. For a history of the principle of
appellate review, see generally Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41
YALE L.J. 539 (1932) (describing methods and stages of appellate review process);
Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEx. L. REV. 126 (1927) (discussing
development of appellate process in state courts).
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nary writ of mandamus"8 or of the more recently minted "collateral
order" doctrine.99 By these means, the courts of appeals established a
pattern of review to preclude idiosyncratic exercise of the most impor-
tant procedural powers conferred on district courts.1 00 In the last dec-
ade, perhaps under the pressure of heavy appellate caseloads, this role
of the courts of appeals may have weakened.' 01 Nevertheless, it remains
true that flexible, discretionary procedures have not resulted in much of
the "one-judge decisions" that were common in the nineteenth cen-
tury.'0 2 The resulting system is discretionary, but seldom arbitrary.
Third, the Civil Rules' loose texture has invited the development
of somewhat elaborate local rules promulgated by district courts. Stand-
ing orders and local rules of court are largely products of the last two
decades.' 03 This development cuts against the grain of the 1934 aim to
establish national rules,'04 and also sometimes offends the principles of
"8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 73, 81. See
also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959) (noting as settled
law the use of mandamus to require a jury trial); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352
U.S. 249, 254-55, 259-60 (1957) (noting appellate courts' discretionary power to issue
writ of mandamus).
" See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (articu-
lating the collateral order doctrine) (citing Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 567, 569 (1828)); cf. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 200, 204-05 (1848)
(describing the role of interlocutory orders in American and English courts).
100 See Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38
S.C.L. REV. 411, 426 (1987) (noting circuit courts' use of en banc procedures to con-
trol idiosyncratic panels that might enter errant decisions). See generally Federal Civil
Appellate Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory Restatement, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
13 (Spring 1984) (a comprehensive summary of appellate standards of review).
101 See, e.g., Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (re-
versing mandamus action, and noting appellate court's desire to review encroaches on
the policy against piecemeal review); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468-76 (1978) (limiting the collateral order and "death knell" doctrines); Will v. Cal-
vert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 667 (1978) (declaring an issuance of mandamus pre-
mature); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 642-43
(1976) (chastising court of appeals for reversing district court's imposition of sanction of
dismissal).
102 The "one-judge" decision was a complaint giving rise to the Evarts Act. See 21
CONG. REc. 3402 (1890); see also F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF
THE SUPREME COURT 98-99 (1928) (discussing Evarts' version of the role of jurisdic-
tion of the district and circuit courts); R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL
CASES 385-86 (1941).
10. The Supreme Court cautioned against localism in Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S.
641, 650 (1960) (striking local rule that authorized discovery-deposition practice in
admiralty cases as inconsistent with General Admiralty Rules), but opened wide the
door in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1973) (upholding, as not inconsistent
with Rule 48, local rule allowing 6-member juries in civil cases). See generally COM-
MITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, LOCAL RULES PROJECT (providing a full discussion of the various
aspects of the local rules) [hereinafter LOCAL RULES PROJECT].
104 See Subrin, supra note 66, at 2001; Rules Enabling Act of 1985: Hearing on
H.R. 2633 and H.R. 3550 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
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generalism and flexibility. Thus, some standing orders are not trans-
substantive, nor perhaps even procedural; some may well violate not
only the limits of Rule 83 which authorizes local rules, but also the
Rules Enabling Act, and even the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers.105 Other local rules may constrict tightly the discretion that
the Federal Rules intended to confer on the individual judge con-
fronting the particular case. In response to these concerns, Congress
recently acted to subject local rules and standing orders to appropriate
constraints.10 6 On the other hand, it is perhaps possible to overstate the
problem;10 7 it is probably rare for a court to apply a local rule to im-
pede consideration of substantive merits.
Fourth, flexibility in the rules reduces the level of political interest
in procedural rules. A body of law that reflects no substantive agenda
has no apparent consequences for any political interest group, and
merely equips individual district judges to do their work according to
their own opinions and professional standards, is not material of which
political controversy can be made. In this way, flexibility is linked to
generalism and to the objective of political neutrality in rulemaking.
D. The Role of Congress
The pursuit of political neutrality necessitated by the nature of
rulemaking institutions, with the principles of generalism and flexibil-
ity derived from that pursuit, make the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure unfit to bear substance-specific provisions designed to advance in-
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
24-26 (1985) (statement of Professor Stephen B. Burbank, University of Pennsylvania
Law School) (discussing the legislative history and initial Advisory Committee interpre-
tation of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934).
101 See, e.g., Carter v. Clark, 616 F.2d 228, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
a local rule requiring inmates' pleadings be notarized conflicted with federal statute
and therefore violative of 28 U.S.C. § 2071); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508
F.2d 152, 162-64 (3d Cir. 1975) (striking local rule empowering court to require prior
judicial approval of plaintiff's or counsel's communication with actual or potential class
members as violative of first amendment and Rule 23's underlying policy and as
outside court's statutory authority). Additional cases are cited in 12 FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at § 3153 nn. 53-55 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
106 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat. 4642, 4650 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2074) (requiring the Judicial Con-
ference to review, and to modify or abrogate if inconsistent with federal law, rules
prescribed under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982) by courts other than the Supreme Court
and district courts).
107 See, e.g., Woodham v. American Cystoscope Co., 335 F.2d 551, 552, 557 (5th
Cir. 1964) (referring to the local rules at issue as "a series of traps for the free-of-fault
plaintiff" and holding that failure to comply with one of those rules did not warrant
dismissal); see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 71, at 407 (quoting Woodham and stating
that local rules "often provide 'a series of traps' for lawyers from other districts").
1989] 2085
2086 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
terests organized around external political aims. Thus, no Civil Rule or
amendment finding its way up the long ladder of rulemaking has ever
evoked a significant substantive political conflict in Congress. Nor is it
likely that such an amendment could move through the existing system
without fundamental change in the premises from which rulemaking
proceeds.
If confronted by a politically organized group bent on using its
power to reshape civil procedure to the disadvantage of the group's ad-
versaries, rulemakers would have little choice but to refer the group to
Congress and continue as best they could (in the semi-Rawlsian pos-
ture) to pursue procedural justice for all litigants with as little regard
as possible for outcomes in specific classes of disputes.
There may be times when Congress should respond to cries for
substance-specific procedural advantage. Clearly, procedure can affect
substance and there are constituencies that Congress might wish to
favor who could benefit from a legislated thumb on the procedural
scales. If necessary to effect enforcement of a substantive right, Con-
gress may be justified in building into substantive enactments specific
procedural provisions.108
Yet there are reasons for Congress to proceed cautiously in doing
so. First, it is difficult to foresee the secondary institutional conse-
quences or the consequences for groups not represented at a legislative
hearing of a special procedural arrangement. Second, Congress faces
the risk that such an arrangement may in time create complexity that
transforms the process into one preoccupied with procedural miscue
rather than enforcement of the substantive laws that Congress has writ-
ten. Finally, there is a longer-term risk that not only Congress but even
the judges will lose their feel for the values of procedural justice that
are the core of the present rules.
Are there nevertheless major problems of civil procedure that
would yield more readily to multiple solutions such as Congress might
provide, each fashioned to meet the needs of litigants asserting a partic-
ular substantive right? If so, what might they be? If this is, as I sus-
pect, an empty set, then perhaps we proceduralists can redirect atten-
tion to making generalized and flexible rules as wisely as we can to fit
the collective needs of all.
To provide a basis for the answer, let us turn to what is perhaps
the most intractable problem of contemporary procedure and consider
whether there should be one rule or many, dealing with the disposition
108 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES ENABLING ACT OF 1985,
H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1985) (referring to Congressional enact-
ment of legislation amending Rule 4).
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of manifestly unfounded assertions. Would it be wise to ask Congress
or its political surrogates to give us a special Rule 56 for antitrust,
environmental, negligence, or school desegregation cases?
III. MANIFESTLY UNFOUNDED CONTENTIONS
A. A "Trans-substantive" Problem
The manifestly unfounded contention is an elementary problem
faced in every procedural system in every kind of case. Some, even
many, claims and defenses are so meritless that it is unjust to an adver-
sary to accord them plenary consideration. Indeed, many assertions of
litigants are advanced despite a party's almost certain knowledge that
they will fail.
Familiar incentives abide among litigants in any legal process and
produce manifestly unfounded contentions. Some of these contentions
are irrational. Common meanness stimulated by an adversary's insis-
tence on a legal claim or defense is illustrative; few situations rouse a
deeper and more hostile response than to be in a dispute in which law
and justice are on the other side. Anger and desperation are the parents
of many false contentions, and professional lawyers are not immune to
such feelings, especially when their clients feel them. Irrational conten-
tions are presumably more likely to be made by litigants in situations
evoking high levels of emotion.
Rational self-interest or simple greed may also be served by mak-
ing ill-founded contentions. Even an unfounded contention may require
time and treasure of an adversary. Threat of such costs may enhance a
bargaining position, sometimes substantially. Because the surest conse-
quence of making an unfounded contention is the delay that results,
and because most defendants benefit from delay, defendants are per-
haps more likely than plaintiffs to make such tactical unfounded con-
tentions, but even a groundless complaint may prove to have "nui-
sance" value to the plaintiff. A stronger party can gain a great
advantage particularly if the adversary has few resources to invest in
the dispute. "[M]ight," as Dickens had it, has the means of "wearying
out the right."109
These familiar incentives, deeply rooted as they are in less admira-
ble but widely-shared human traits, are endemic and ubiquitous, affect-
ing in varying degrees conduct in all manner of cases at all times. In-
deed, it seems likely that all legal systems must make some provision to
"I9 C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 2 (1956).
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control the wasteful and destructive tendencies of adversaries. 10 Al-
though any provision will have different effects in different classes of
cases, designs to prevent these incentives from playing out their destruc-
tive courses is a task suitable to rulemakers who do not consider sub-
stantive categories.
That a system must inhibit the making of unfounded contentions
is a function of the gross economic costs that disputants are otherwise
able to impose on one another."' In a system that resolves disputes
quickly at very low cost, the harm caused by unfounded contentions is
less and the need to inhibit them is accordingly reduced. Contemporary
litigation in the federal courts stands at the opposite pole; the costs that
federal litigants can impose on one another are sometimes truly he-
roic," 2 and seldom insubstantial. Modern discovery and liberal rules of
joinder" 3 weigh especially in this balance.
These and other features bearing on the contemporary legal pro-
fession's structure and reward system inflate the incentives to make un-
founded contentions, both as claims and as defenses, thus enhancing the
need for the system to inhibit the impulse. There is wide recognition
that this universal problem is especially acute in federal practice" 4 and
is seldom questioned.
The architects of 1938 did not foresee many developments that
contribute to the high cost contemporary federal litigation. They did
not take into account, for example, the voluminous records required by
the Internal Revenue Code, our numerous regulatory schemes, the rise
of the expert witness, the inventions of the duplicator, or the computer
and the cathode-ray tube. Each of these developments, and others, has
110 In rural or primitive systems, the deterrent may be moral suasion, although in
some primitive cultures, there may be no deterrence practiced. See, e.g., M.
GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODE-
SIA 21 (2d ed. 1967) (describing the tribal courts' conception of "relevance" in dispute
settlement).
... See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979) (noting the need
for courts to "be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance
settlements" in class actions); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
740-41 (1975) (discussing costs imposed on defendants in securities cases brought under
Rule 10b-5 and attributing these costs to such cases' inherent settlement value, regard-
less of merit, and often-extensive discovery).
12 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
575-77 (1986) (a case involving 21 corporate defendants, spanning 12 years, and pro-
ducing published opinions sufficient to "fill an entire volume of the Federal
Supplement").
11 See FED. R. Civ. P. 18-25.
114 See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997,
1000 (1980) (Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist, JJ. dissenting); Rosenberg & King,




created weaknesses in the system by elevating its potential cost. Law-
yers, when they can, turn such weaknesses to adversarial advantage,
transforming them into endemic sources of injustice.
Contributing to an apparent, but unanticipated, increase in the ex-
ploitative impulses of some members of the bar have been the national
phenomena of urbanization, growth in the size of and increasing spe-
cialization of the bar, the near universalization of hourly billing rates
by large law firms, the growth of many law firms to the size of small
armies, and the enactment of fee-shifting statutes." 5 At the same time,
the supply of mutual trust or professional fraternity that can serve to
constrain the mutually destructive tendencies of adversaries is dimin-
ished.'16 Also a factor is the increasing indeterminacy of federal law,
arising in part from the structural weakness of the appellate hierarchy,
that makes a federal appeal more like a Las Vegas gaming device than
we care to admit." 7 Such indeterminacy weakens the constraints of
professionalism on lawyers as they find it harder to distinguish ground-
less claims or defenses from marginal ones.
The deficiencies of the process are now sufficiently well recognized
to have begotten a large scale reaction in the movement to alternative
dispute resolution. That movement reflects the widely shared sentiment
that contemporary litigation is too expensive." 8 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure may have contributed to this dissatisfaction; they cer-
tainly have not prevented the development that caused it.
In response, for the last decade rulemakers have searched anew for
means to reduce the frequency with which lawyers use their skills to
impose needless costs on adversaries, but every corrective considered has
had its own independent costs. Thus far, those methods tried have not
given satisfaction to users of the federal courts or to those involved in
115 For further discussion of the relationship of FED. R. Civ. P. 56 to fee-shifting,
see infra note 232 and accompanying text.
116 See generally Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 787, 832-39 (discussing
a survey of attorneys' views on discovery, in which survey respondents reported that, in
over half of their cases, evasive, incomplete, or dilatory responses impeded discovery
efforts).
117 See Address by Dean Paul Carrington, U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. Dis-
trict Courts: Relationships in the Future (Oct. 25, 1988) (Bicentennial Conference,
Federal Judicial Center).
"I See Banks, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Return to Basics, 61 AUSTRA-
LIAN L.J. 569, 571 (1987) (attributing the growth of alternative dispute resolution in
the United States in part to corporate defendants' efforts to promote less costly alterna-
tives to litigation); Lieberman & Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 425, 425-26 (1986) (defining alternative dispute
resolution as, in part, "a set of practices and techniques that aim[s] . . . to reduce the
cost of conventional litigation").
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rulemaking.
B. Rule 56, The Instrument of Choice
Our traditional tool for addressing this problem was, of course, the
demurrer. At common law, the demurrer took two forms, the more fa-
miliar demurrer to the pleading.. 9 and the more antiquated demurrer
to the evidence. 2 Our procedural system retained the demurrer to the
pleading in nineteenth-century code practice, 21 but nearly abandoned
it in 1938 because experience taught that pleading motion practice was
inefficient, perhaps even counterproductive, often providing opportunity
for delay and harassment, but seldom providing effective means to dis-
pose of unfounded contentions. 22 Indeed, Charles Clark, the first Re-
porter and draftsman of the 1938 Rules, would have preferred to elimi-
nate pleading motion practice altogether as a waste. 23 He was,
however, obliged to yield to the Advisory Committee's judgment, and
Rule 12 retained a modern analogue to the demurrer to the pleadings.
That vestige remains, alive and well, and some claim it causes much
waste.124
The 1938 rulemakers placed primary reliance on Rule 56 provid-
ing for summary judgment as the means to extinguish unfounded alle-
gations, claims, and defenses. This device was not a 1938 invention; it
bore some resemblance to the old demurrer to the evidence, and to other
devices in use in the nineteenth century. 2 Its familiar but important
feature was, and is, that it is not limited in its inquiry by what the
parties say in their pleadings, but affords a means by which the court
can observe the realities of potential proof underlying those contentions.
There is no need here to review Rule 56's familiar history from
1938 to date. Rule 56 failed to meet the need adequately,"2 6 becoming
119 See R. MILLAR, supra note 76, at 172-78.
120 See id. at 298-99.
12 See C. CLARK, supra note 90, at 502, 504-12.
12 See id. at 540-45.
1213 See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure I. Pleadings and Par-
ties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1308 (1935); Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 918 (1976).
124 See Marcus, supra note 73, at 434-36, 451-53, 492-93 (arguing that pleading
motion practice tends to be a waste of time).
12 See Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure, 31 IND.
L.J. 329, 329-43 (1956).
128 See Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83
YALE L.J. 745, 746 (1974) (arguing that "some useless trials" are conducted because a
"useful rationale" is lacking in summary judgment adjudications); McLauchlan, An
Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 459
(1977) (discussing the disturbingly differential effects of the rule's use depending on
which party uses it); Sonenschein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary
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perhaps itself a tool for delay, 2' while, as we have noted, other fea-
tures of the 1938 rules and post-1938 developments elevated the need to
constrain the making of unfounded contentions.' 2 As Donald Elliott
has described it, there was "a fundamental imbalance in the Rules be-
tween the techniques available for developing and expanding issues and
those for narrowing or resolving them prior to trial."' 29
If the summary judgment rule had fulfilled the hopes of the 1938
draftsmen, there would have been little reason to develop most of the
procedural adaptations that have been made in the last decade or so. It
would seem that the development of managerial judging techniques,'30
recognized in the 1983 amendment of Rule 16, has been in part a re-
sponse to Rule 56's failure.' A similar response was the development
in 1983 of sanctions under Rules 7, 11, and 26;132 all changes designed
to contain the metastasis of litigation by proliferation of unfounded con-
tentions."' 3 Likewise, the aborted effort to develop settlement incentives
under Rule 68' was, in an important sense, responsive to the failure
of Rule 56.
Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 774, 774-76 (1983).
127 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576-82
(1986) (reviewing the case's 12-year history, most of which involved defendants' sum-
mary judgment motion); Bauman, supra note 125, at 354-55.
12s See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
119 Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 306, 319 (1986).
130 See, e.g., Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix?, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 19-22 (1984) (noting the growth and acceptance of increased judicial manage-
ment of cases as a means of controlling the litigation process's excesses); Peckham, The
Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding A Case from Filing to
Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770-73 (1981) (suggesting that judges as case
managers, especially in the pretrial realm, have increased federal courts' efficiency in
the face of burgeoning caseloads); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374,
376-80 (1982) (describing judges' increasing interest in managing their caseloads, espe-
cially during the pretrial phase).
1"1 See generally A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FED-
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT
AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (Federal Judicial Center, 1984) (discussing managerial
judging and rule 16).
... For comment on the amendments and their effect on the litigation process, see
generally Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example
of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule
11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punish-
ment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986); Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1013 (1988); Comment, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 26 - Scalpel or Meat-ax?
The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 OHIo ST. L.J.
183 (1985).
"' The 1983 amendments were effective August 1. See generally A. MILLER,
supra note 131 (discussing the objectives of the rule amendments, their implementation,
and their advantages).
""' See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Because the 1983 reforms may be inadequately effective, overly
intrusive on the role of parties and counsel, or both, a search for better
solutions to the problem of unfounded contentions remained on
rulemakers' agendas. When the proposals to amend Rule 68 encoun-
tered difficulty, the Civil Rules Committee began to consider the possi-
bility of reviving the original 1938 conception of Rule 56. The Com-
mittee's interest in Rule 56 was stimulated by the publication of articles
by Judges Stuart Pollak 35  and William Schwarzer;136  Judge
Schwarzer also provided a very helpful rewrite of the Rule's text.
137
Summary disposition rightly evokes concern that decisions may be
inaccurate and hence unjust. Indeed, the understandable anxiety about
aborting meritorious claims or defenses appears to have caused Rule
56's failure. On the positive side, summary disposition offers the prom-
ise of being more "speedy and inexpensive" and hence more just.
Summary judgment has attractions as an alternative both to sanc-
tions and to managerial judging. With respect to sanctions, summary
disposition seems preferable because the court judges the claims, de-
fenses, or issues directly, not the motives or professionalism of their
advocates. With respect to managerial judging, summary disposition
makes the court more accountable on review for its actions. Moreover,
both sanctions and managerial judging threaten the judge's neutrality
in the traditional trial, while summary disposition does not. The Com-
mittee was not wrong, therefore, to begin serious reconsideration of
Rule 56 in 1985.
C. The Events of 1986
While the Civil Rules Committee in 1986 pondered Judge
Schwarzer's drafting and explored additional enhancing changes in
Rule 56, the Supreme Court handed down a trilogy of decisions inter-
preting and applying the rule.13 1 It is not necessary here to review
135 See Pollak, Liberalizing Summary Adjudication: A Proposal, 36 HASTINGS
L.J. 419, 419 (1985) (noting counsels' belief in the slim chances of prevailing in a
summary judgement motion as a major reason for reform).
13 See Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genu-
ine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984).
137 See Schwarzer, Summary Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 110
F.R.D. 213, 214-15 (1986) (offering a revised text to the rule which eliminates "unnec-
essary, confusing, and contradictory verbiage").
13' The cases were Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986) (hold-
ing summary judgment proper if pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, ad-
missions on file, and affidavits show no genuine issue of material fact), Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (requiring a "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard in a summary judgment motion in a libel action), and Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986) (rejecting lower
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those cases. In sum, they apparently revived summary judgment as a
tool for dealing with the problem of unfounded contentions. The Court
explained that:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part
of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed "to se-
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1 . . . . Rule 56 must be con-
strued with due regard not only for the rights of persons as-
serting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact
to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for
the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to
demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to
trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.139
Perhaps the most impressive indication of the decision's consequence
was a Second Circuit response noting that:
It appears that in this circuit some litigants are reluctant to
make full use of the summary judgment process because of
their perception that this court is unsympathetic to such mo-
tions and frequently reverses grants of summary judgment.
Whatever may have been the accuracy of this view in years
gone by, it is decidedly inaccurate at the present
time. . 140
In short, it is possible that the trilogy has made Rule 56 a more power-
ful engine than the Civil Rules Committee contemplated when it first
commenced re-study of the rule in 1985.
It is still early to evaluate the trilogy's effect on the realities of
federal practice. It is surely possible that the effort to provide the bal-
ance that Donald Elliott describes the 1938 Rules as lacking 1" could be
taken too far. Given the very heavy docket burdens that district judges
now face,' 42 it is a reasonable concern that some may be tempted to
court's direct evidence to defeat summary judgment claim as irrelevant and requiring
consideration of plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing in antitrust action).
119 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
140 Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 932 (1987).
141 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
142 But see Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 61-66 (1983) (arguing that legal elites foster the myth of
the "litigation explosion" by focusing solely on increases in the number of cases filed,
without considering the marked growth in pre-trial dispute resolution); Galanter, The
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overuse the devices of sanctions, summary judgment, and managerial
judging to clear their civil dockets of large numbers of cases, including
many, perhaps, that are meritorious, or at least sufficiently meritorious
to deserve plenary attention.
Under the circumstances, the Civil Rules Committee may post-
pone further consideration of Rule 56 until smoke clears from the Su-
preme Court trilogy. On the other hand, with the threat that the share
of our national wealth invested in federal civil litigation may continue
to rise,"4 3 the shared concern about the cost of federal litigation has not
abated, and the alternative dispute resolution movement proceeds apace
as a response. It is not certain that the matter will ever be more clear
than it is now. Perhaps, on this occasion, valor is the better part of
discretion, and the rule should now be revised to make yet one more
effort to use judicial action to control the making of manifestly un-
founded contentions.
With the possibility of amending Rule 56 a real one, this Article is
intended to serve a secondary purpose of attracting comments on a draft
revision of the rule even from those not inclined to the "non-trans-sub-
stantive" approach to the problem. Moreover, if revision of the rule is
timely, minor blemishes can be corrected at the same time. As Judge
Schwarzer has demonstrated, 44 the text of Rule 56 is not felicitous.
While it has generally been the wise policy of the Civil Rules Commit-
tee not to rewrite a rule for only cosmetic reasons, there is a willingness
to transform the text of a rule to make it more useful and accessible
while effecting significant reform. For these reasons, no suggestion for
the improvement of Rule 56 would be untimely.
IV. REWRITING RULE 56
A. Establishment of Fact and Law
The most promising proposal to make Rule 56 more effective is to
make the device provided by subdivision (d) more available. Subdivision
(d) authorizes a court to ascertain "what material facts are actually and
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 5-28 (1986) (refuting claims of
a "litigation explosion" in state and federal courts).
143 While Professor Galanter has raised substantial doubts about the seriousness
of a general "litigation explosion" in the United States, see supra note 142, there is
little reason to doubt that the federal caseloads are heavy, or that federal civil litigation
is expensive. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-95
(1985) (discussing the extent and causes of the caseload explosion); cf. Atiyah, supra
note 14, at 1009-12 (noting that the total cost of tort suits in the United States is at
least ten times higher per capita than in the United Kingdom).
144 See Schwarzer, supra note 137, at 213-14.
[Vol. 137:2067
NON-TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE RULES
in good faith controverted," and then to specify "the facts that appear
without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing
such further proceedings in the action as are just." The present rule
also provides that at trial "the facts so specified shall be deemed
established.
'145
The utility of this device is presently diminished because judges
may use it only as a response to a motion for dispositive summary
judgment, 46 but there is no sufficient reason to limit the device in this
way. At least one court has held that the procedure may be used where
summary disposition of the case is clearly inappropriate, if apparent
economies would accrue.14' Given the 1983 amendment to Rule 7, if a
pleading has one triable issue a summary judgement motion would fail;
hence a court is obliged to deter a party from making the motion. This
is true even if the moving party might reasonably expect to secure es-
tablishment of every other fact seemingly disputed by the pleadings,
and thereby confine the range of discovery. While Rule 16(c)(1) pres-
ently authorizes disposition of non-disputed issues, it is not explicit in
authorizing the court to dispose of issues over the objection of a party.
Accordingly, one possible change that might be made is to make subdi-
vision (d) independent of efforts to dispose whole cases.
In addition to authorizing a court to "establish facts" not genu-
inely in dispute, it may also be useful to authorize a similar ruling to
"establish law." Many dispositions on summary judgment rest purely
on legal determinations. 48 It is, moreover, not uncommon in a complex
case for the parties to conduct prolonged discovery and pretrial litiga-
tion regarding factual disputes that are ultimately legally immaterial.
Where the risk of such waste appears substantial, it would serve the
145 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d). See, e.g., Gore v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 373 F.2d
717, 727 (2d Cir. 1967) (providing that "the facts found by the judge would ... [be]
established"); 10A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at § 2737
(1983 and Supp. 1988) (noting that "[a]t the trial on the remaining issues, the facts
determined under Rule 56(d) will be deemed to be established").
146 See, e.g., Arado v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 626 F. Supp. 506, 509
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating that Rule 56(d) allows granting appealable "judgments" only
if they dispose of entire claims); 10A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra
note 28, at § 2737 & n.5.1.
147 See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 694, 696
(11th Cir. 1985); see also Elliott, supra note 129, at 316-18 (discussing the possible
damages of arbitrary practices by managerial judges).
148 Clark and Samenow treat the stipulated record as the paradigm case for sum-
mary judgment. See Clark & Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423,
471 (1929). See generally Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shim-
mering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process,
49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 135 (1988) (interpreting Clark and Samenow's work on sum-
mary judgement).
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needs of justice and efficiency to resolve a legal issue on which the ma-
teriality of the fact in dispute may depend. If the controlling law is in
substantial doubt, the device of establishing law could be linked use-
fully to certified interlocutory review of controlling questions. 49
It would appear useful to prescribe that an order establishing facts
or law be made in writing and signed by the judge.1 50 This would pro-
tect against the risk that a judge's casual or unguarded comment on the
probative material be taken by a party as a solemn judicial act.
B. Material Used to Establish Fact
Subdivision (e) of Rule 56 presently governs the quality of the
material required to establish facts to support summary judgment.
There appears to be no reason to make substantial change in that pro-
vision, but there are several significant modifications that might be
appropriate.
First, it would seem useful to stop requiring parties to attach all
documents necessary for an establishment of fact to the moving pa-
pers. 5 ' It would ease practice to allow incorporation by reference so
long as parties attached the appropriate excerpt and the means of con-
firmation. Similarly, a revision might conform the rule to the Federal
Rules of Evidence"5 2 by allowing charts, summaries, and calculations of
voluminous materials in the moving papers.
Second, a revision should expressly allow declarations under pen-
alty of perjury as an explicit alternative to Rule 56 (e)'s present affida-
vit requirement. This change would conform the rules to the 1976 leg-
islation authorizing alternate use of this device.' 5
Third, it may be desirable-to require a party relying on a docu-
ment to specify where to find the probative material in the document.
This alteration would deter the dilatory tactic of filing voluminous doc-
uments in response to a motion to establish a fact, thereby making the
adversary and court conduct a search while the opposing party saves
149 See 28 U.S.c § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (allowing a district judge, in
entering an order not otherwise appealable, to state in writing to the court of appeals
that an immediate appeal from the order may substantially advance the course of the
litigation).
150 Certain judgments, such as general verdicts of a jury, can be signed by the
clerk. See FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
' "Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affi-
davit shall be attached thereto or served therewith." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
152 "The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which can-
not conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, sum-
mary, or calculation." FED. R. EvID. 1006.




(or stumbles upon) a substantial point to be disclosed for the first time
on appeal.'"
C. The Standard Applied in Establishing Facts
If a provision is to be made for establishing fact and law more
frequently, the committee will face an opportunity, and perhaps an ob-
ligation, to clarify the standard for establishing facts on the basis of the
evidentiary material supplied by the parties. Presently Rule 56(c) pro-
vides little guidance. It states that summary judgment shall be granted
if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and. . . the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." This language,
even as illuminated by a half century of experience, may not be helpful
to courts performing the task of disposing of a manifestly unfounded
assertion.
Perhaps a clearer standard would embolden judges to grant sum-
mary judgement more frequently when assertions are unfounded. In
the past, Rule 56 has been enfeebled by courts reluctant to take respon-
sibility for assessing the genuineness of contentions. At one time, we
were witness to the "slightest doubt" test"5 requiring plenary trial if
there was the slightest possibility that a party opposing an establish-
ment of fact might have access to favorable probative evidence.
More recently, the Supreme Court has usefully analogized the
standard to be applied in establishing facts prior to trial with the stan-
dard applied after trial in directing a verdict. 5 The test cannot be
identical because the post-trial determination is made on the basis of a
compiled record, not an apparent record that is yet to be made and can
154 See, e.g., Stepanischen v., Merchants Dispatch Trans. Corp., 722 F.2d 922,
927 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting this phenomenon in the case of the court having to decide a
summary judgment motion without information from one party's counsel, who filed
substantially more papers on appeal).
155 See, e.g., Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135
(2d Cir. 1945) ("A litigant has a right to a trial when there is the slightest doubt as to
the facts . . . ."). This test had its analogue in the older "scintilla rule." See, e.g.,
Danner, The Scintilla Rule in Ohio, 7 U. CIN. L. REV. 237, 237 n.5 (1933) (defining
the scintilla rule as requiring that a case go to the jury if there is "any evidence, how-
ever slight, tending to support a material issue"). The demise of the older rule was
signalled in Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1871) (noting
abandonment of the scintilla rule), and Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116, 120-
122 (1874) (same). But see Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 399-406 (1942)
(Black, J., dissenting) (arguing against constriction of seventh amendment rights
through disposition by the courts).
15 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); see also
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11 (1983) ("[Glenuine
issue" test used for summary judgment is very close to "reasonable jury" rule applied
to directed verdict.). But see Stempel, supra note 148, at 125 (criticizing the analysis in
footnote 11 of Bill Johnson's).
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therefore be appraised only with somewhat greater caution.157 Yet the
issues are fundamentally the same at both times: If a fact cannot be
rejected by a reasonable trier of fact on the basis of the evidence
presented or available, the fact may be established by the court. 5"
When a party seeks to establish facts prior to trial, or to treat facts as
established at trial without regard for the trier of fact's decision, the
court must allow every reasonable inference from the evidence and re-
serve for the trier of fact to decide whether any particular reasonable
inference or interpretation is appropriate in the case at hand.'59 It may
therefore be helpful to express this concept in the text of the rule, thus:
"A fact may be established only if there is no evidentiary basis for a
reasonable trier of fact to reject it."' 6
One advantage in linking the standard for establishing a fact with
the standard for directed verdict is that it avoids any possible seventh
amendment issues.1 6' To put the matter obversely, the right to jury
trial applies only to facts which, by definition, cannot be established
under the directed verdict standard.'
6 2
15I See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.19 (3d ed. 1985) (noting
reasons for caution in granting summary judgment); 10 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE, supra note 28, at § 2713.1 (2d ed. 1983); Louis, supra note 126. at 762-63,
767-69 (arguing that summary judgment standard needs to permit reasonable excuses
for inability to produce evidence and prospect of obtaining more).
158 Compare Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 386 (1943) (on motion for
directed verdict, lack of evidence regarding five-year period precluded finding total and
continuous disability during that period) with Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986) (summary judgment is appropriate where it appears that party bearing
burden of proof lacks evidence to support case). See generally Currie, Thoughts on
Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 72, 79 (1977) (re-
viewing case law dealing with directed verdicts and summary judgment, and concluding
that the "purpose of Rule 56 requires" that the same standard be applied); Sonen-
schein, supra note 126 (arguing that directed verdict standard should be applied in all
summary judgment dispositions, even if state of mind or credibility are implicated).
158 Compare Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 661 (1873)
("If, upon any construction which the jury was authorized to put upon the evidence, or
by any inferences they were authorized to draw from it, the conclusion of negligence
can be justified," then a directed verdict is improper) with Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249
(defeating summary judgment motion requires only that sufficient evidence "'be shown
to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial"
(quoting First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968))
and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
("On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ...
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." (citation
omitted)).
180 See Appendix 1, infra at 2117, § (e)(1).
181 Cf Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320
(1902) (upholding, against seventh amendment challenge, procedural rule requiring fil-
ing of affidavit that states specific grounds of defense before court will consider right to
trial by jury to have accrued).
162 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-96 (1943) (rejecting seventh
amendment challenge to directed verdict); Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295
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There is, of course, no reason to believe that such a codification of
the standard for determining genuineness will resolve many cases; such
a standard would be intended only to guide the judgement of the court.
As Edward Cooper said of the seventh amendment, such a rule
does not sanctify any particular linguistic formulation of the
standards elaborating its basic command. It does not even
prescribe mandatory answers to the relatively restricted
range of control questions susceptible of categorical answer.
Federal courts may legitimately accord greater factfinding
and law applying freedom to juries in some areas than in
others, depending on the strength of the desire to keep pure
the legal rules involved and on the nature of the conse-
quences of jury error."6
The standard would thus be true to the traditions of generality and
flexibility discussed above.""
The general standard for establishing a fact should not vary mate-
rially when the law being applied is state law rather than federal law.
With respect to the directed verdict standard, this has been the holding
of most courts of appeals, even in cases in which jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship.165 Exception may appropriately be made where
a special standard is an explicit embodiment of the substantive law,
state or federal, that is being enforced in a federal court action.'6
Nor should the standard vary materially when the issue of fact is
to be tried on a paper record.1 67 If the available evidence is conflicting,
the proceeding should be plenary with respect to that factual issue. If
the case is tried without a jury, the court should make a finding of fact
as required by Rule 52 rather than anticipating it by establishing the
U.S. 654, 659-61 (1935) (holding that whether evidence is sufficient is question of law
to be resolved by the court and does not implicate seventh amendment).
1"3 Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55
MINN. L. REV. 903, 990 (1971).
16' See supra notes 63-107 and accompanying text.
'" This rule is rooted in the seventh amendment's applicability to diversity litiga-
tion. See Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1931). See generally 9
FEDERAL PRAcriCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at § 2525 n.69 (1971 & Supp.
1988) (stating that the federal test is applied to determine questions of sufficiency).
166 See generally Cooper, supra note 163, at 978-89 (discussing this question as
applied to directed verdicts, in terms of balancing state and federal interests in their
respective standards).
17 Compare in this respect FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (findings of fact in cases tried
without a jury shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence). See also Sonenschein, supra note 126, at 809-10 (arguing that
same summary judgment standard applies when state of mind or credibility are at is-
sue, despite increased importance of demeanor evidence to such issues).
19891 2099
2100 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
fact prior to trial. Finally, to the extent that summary judgment is
sometimes used merely to give a calendar preference to a documents
case, it is more appropriate to proceed pursuant to Rule 40, and to find
facts under Rule 52, than to establish them under Rule 56.
D. The Burden of Producing Evidence; Access to Discovery
Much of the difficulty with summary judgment practice over five
decades has related to the burden of producing evidence, or, more pre-
cisely, apparent evidence.' The Supreme Court seems to have clari-
fied the matter by holding that a fact is not genuinely in dispute if the
party bearing the burden of producing evidence of that fact is unable to
point to any available material that might be used as proof to bear that
burden.169 In an appropriate case, an inference from the available ma-
terial that is plausible enough for substantiating a finding may satisfy
the non-moving party's burden.' 70 Because it has no burden of produc-
tion, however, the moving party may bear a lesser burden, which re-
quires only a review of the available material and an assertion (under
the constraints of Rule 7)17' that the opposing party cannot produce
any probative evidence with respect to the fact to be established.1 7 1 It
might be useful to clarify these matters in the text of the rule governing
the establishment of fact.
One difficulty with the burden of producing evidence is that courts
address establishment of facts, like summary judgment, not merely
before trial, but sometimes even before the opposing party has ex-
hausted discovery. The present Rule 56(f) gives the court discretion to
168 See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 148, 153 (1970) (requir-
ing defendant-movant to show absence of genuine issue of material fact, thus reversing
district court's determination that plaintiff bore burden of alleging facts from which
conspiracy might be inferred). See generally 10A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, supra note 28, at § 2727 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1988) (discussing burden of
proof and presumptions on motion for summary judgment).
1.. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (declaring that sum-
mary judgment may be properly entered against "party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial").
1I See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158 ("If a policeman were present, we think it would
be open to a jury" to infer a conspiracy, thereby rendering summary judgment inappro-
priate.); Louis, supra note 126, at 759 (noting that a judge may not, on a summary
judgment motion, reject favorable inferences that may be drawn).
171 FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3) requires "[aill motions [to] be signed in accordance
with Rule 11." Rule 11, in turn, provides that the lawyer's signature warrants that a
reasonable inquiry has been made and that the signer believes the motion (or other
pleading) to be "well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension of existing law." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
112 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 (declaring burden on moving party met by mo-
vant pointing out absence of evidence that supports nonmovant's case).
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grant a continuance to a party opposing summary judgment when per-
tinent affidavits or evidentiary material are not yet available.1"' It may
be an abuse of discretion to withhold such a continuance when discov-
ery promises to relieve a need.
17
-
An important use of the establishment of fact is to terminate dis-
covery that meanders expensively through warehouses of records and
weeks of depositions in the hope, perhaps manifestly forlorn, that some
scraps of probative material will appear and enable the discovering
party to make a genuine issue of a fact otherwise appearing to be suita-
ble to establishment.17 5 A system promising "speedy and inexpensive"
justice is surely obliged to protect parties from the cost of inept discov-
ery, desperation discovery, or discovery better calculated to punish an
adversary or extort a nuisance settlement than to illuminate a "genu-
ine" issue.17
6
Yet if use of the device is to expand in this way, the rules should
explicitly address the opposing party's entitlement to at least some un-
constrained opportunity for using discovery to uncover the material
necessary for opposing an establishment of fact. Rule 36(a) gives par-
ties thirty days to respond to an admission request, and it seems that an
opposing party should be assured at least that much time for using
173 Compare Tarleton v. Meharry Medical College, 717 F.2d 1523, 1535 (6th
Cir. 1983) (summary judgment should not ordinarily be granted before discovery is
completed) and Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Attorney General,
804 F.2d 1256, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's failure to file affidavits does not
automatically justify refusal to grant continuance where outstanding discovery requests
identify specific facts sought) with SEC v. Spence & Green Chemical Co., 612 F.2d
896, 901 (5th Cir. 1980) (summary judgment may not be avoided by vague assertions
that additional discovery will produce unspecified needed facts) and Hancock Indus. v.
Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 1987) (plaintiff not filing affidavit and giving no
explanation of what facts they hoped to uncover was not entitled to continuance). See
generally 10A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at § 2741 (dis-
cussing sufficiency of reasons for Rule 56(f) continuance).
"' See, e.g., Glen Eden Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 740 F.2d 423, 428
(6th Cir. 1984) (holding withholding continuance abuse of discretion where defendant
had not been forthcoming in discovery and plaintiff sought additional discovery on cer-
tain issues).
175 Under the present rule, unpromising discovery should not delay entry of judg-
ment. See, e.g., Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 814 F.2d 1127, 1138 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding refusal of continuance was not an abuse of discretion where plaintiff
failed to demonstrate how documents she sought would have aided her resistance to
summary judgment motion).
178 See generally Brazil, Civil Discovery: How Bad Are the Problems?, 67 A.B.A.
J. 450 (1981) (reviewing results of American Bar Foundation study of pretrial discov-
ery problems); Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978) (concluding that adversary sys-
tem encourages discovery geared toward partisan pursuit of clients' interests rather
than toward courts' interest in truth-finding).
19891
2102 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
discovery.177 As usual in the Rules, courts should be given discretion to
allow longer time if the opposing party can suggest a feasible course of
discovery that might yield probative material in a reasonable time and
at a reasonable cost to the adversary. Another option would be to
shorten the period in cases in which there are no possible factual
disputes.
178
Moreover, especially if the device's use is to be expanded, the
Rules should assure that opposing parties are given adequate notice
that probative material will have to be produced at a certain time prior
to trial. The present rule provides ten days of notice before hearing on
a motion for summary judgment.17 9 Despite the clarity of that require-
ment, some courts have granted summary judgment against the moving
party 80 or sua sponte at a pretrial conference.' This should not occur
where the moving party has not been specifically challenged to disclose
the basis for that party's own contentions." 2 A provision assuring at
least thirty days to discover would clarify this entitlement of a party
who perhaps mistakenly supposes that she is entitled to a favorable
summary disposition and overlooks a need to discover evidence required
to bear her own burdens.
A number of district courts have promulgated local rules establish-
177 At present, Rule 56 assures an opposing party only 10 days. See infra note
179 and accompanying text; cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (requiring that all parties be
given "reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent" when the court
converts a motion on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment by considering
matter outside the pleadings).
178 Such discretion can, however, be implied. See 10A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at § 2728 (discussing inferred judicial discretion under
Rule 56).
179 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b).
180 See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Indep. Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312
F.2d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 1962); Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 311 (9th Cir.
1982); see also Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567, 570-571
(1952) (noting, approvingly, "trend of rulings in the district courts" holding formal
motion unnecessary). See generally 10A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra
note 28, at § 2720 (discussing entry of summary judgment against moving party in
absence of other party's motion).
'8 See, e.g., Portsmouth Square Inc. v. Shareholders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d
866, 869-70 (9th Cir. 1985). See generally 10A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 28, at § 2720 (discussing entry of summary judgment in absence of formal
motion).
18I See McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1212
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Williams v. City of St. Louis, 783 F.2d 114, 116 (8th Cir. 1986);
Memphis Trust Co. v. Board of Governors, 584 F.2d 921, 924 n.6 (6th Cir. 1978).
This concern is especially acute where the opposing party appears pro se. See
Note, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se Litigant's Right to Notification
of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1109,
1115-28 (1988) (arguing that pro se litigants should be specially advised of require-
ments under summary judgment proceeding).
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ing a presumptive limit of 120 days on the period available for discov-
ery. a83 Arguably, such rules are not authorized by Rule 83184 but the
provision may be a sound one. An amendment to Rule 16(b) to incor-
porate that presumptive limit suggested by the Local Rules Project' 85 of
the Standing Committee would be congruent with the possible changes
suggested in the provision that is presently Rule 56(0.86
E. Burden on Party Moving for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Rule 56 might also become more effective by providing additional
clarity about each party's burden when one party moves for judgment.
In light of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,'87 it now appears that a moving
party, whether or not it has the burden of producing evidence on the
issues, must at least specify the facts that are appropriately taken as not
genuinely in dispute (and hence suitable for establishment), and ex-
plain the legal basis for the disposition of a claim or defense. Movants
can rely upon their adversaries' pleadings to demonstrate the absence of
genuine dispute, unless the opposing party comes forward with amend-
ments or affidavits suggesting the existence of contrary evidence.
Similarly, an opposing party should be required, regardless of who
bears the burden of producing evidence, to identify any triable issues
that would justify retaining the case on the court's trial docket. The
previous decisions made the proponent of judgment disprove the availa-
bility of evidence to the adversary, even where that adversary would, at
trial, bear the burden of producing evidence and experience an adverse
judgment by failing to do so.' 8 On the other hand, while the opposing
party has no burden to respond, neither the movant nor the court
should be required to search for an unasserted reason to deny a motion
for judgment.'89
183 See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 103, pt. 4, at 6.
184 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (allowing formulation of local rules not inconsistent
with the Rules). See generally, Subrin, supra note 66, at 2019-21 (discussing prolifera-
tion of local rules in light of the conformity goals of the Federal Rules).
185 See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 103, pt. 4, at 6.
s FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (allowing the court to refuse the application for judg-
ment, order a continuance, or "make such other order as is just").
1s7 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
1s That line of cases was based in part on Supreme Court dictum in Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
s Compare Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 804 F.2d 1256, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding "sensible" the practice of consider-
ing outstanding discovery requests in assaying Rule 56(f) contention) with Stepanischen
v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir. 1983) (expressing
frustration at the court's having to decide a summary judgment motion in the absence
of assistance from counsel in the case).
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F. Explained Decisions
While established facts should not be mistaken for a judge's find-
ings of fact made in accordance with Rule 52, the facts, in combination
with established law, may similarly ensure that a disposition made
under Rule 56 is adequately explained to the parties and to the appel-
late court. Ironically, Rule 52(a) requires a court rendering judgment
after trial to explain the decision, yet a disposition made without hear-
ing evidence requires no explanation at all. This situation may create a
problem if the reviewing court misperceives the basis for the decision,
and it may evoke the mistrust of a party whose case is lost quickly and
without stated reasons. 9 ' Requiring an explanation of the application
of established law to established facts would engender more trust.
Although pretrial establishment of fact resembles fact finding in
form, an establishment is not based on an assessment of evidence at
trial and is therefore not entitled to Rule 52's protection of restraint on
review. 9' It might be useful for the rule's text to require an establish-
ment of fact to be treated as a ruling on a question of law; a similar
prescription is found in the present Rule 44.1.192
G. Needed Constraints on Rule 56 Motion Practice
A major problem in fashioning the kind of tool contemplated here
is that, like many other procedural tools, the change itself might become
the instrument of cost and delay. If establishment motion practice be-
came a feature of almost every case, courts would either have to con-
sider probative material to establish facts that are, in the end, immate-
rial in light of the court's view of the law, or the courts would have to
establish law to illumine the materiality of facts that cannot possibly be
proven at trial. Some motions would be filed merely to impose cost on
an adversary and to increase the number of bargaining chips piled up
at the settlement table.
190 Cf Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972) (describing the district court's
order as "opaque and unilluminating as to either the relevant facts or the law with
respect to the merits of appellant's claim"); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (citing appellate court error in reading statute leading to im-
proper summary judgment); P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUS-
TICE ON APPEAL 31-33 (1976) (stating that opinions are indispensable to public confi-
dence, but that resource constraints often require shorter opinions); Fuller, supra note
36, at 387-88 (discussing the necessity of accompanying judicial decisions with
explanations).
191 Cf Bushman v. Halm, 798 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 1986) (appellate court
exercising plenary review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment).
192 FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (court determination of foreign law "shall be treated as a
ruling on a question of law").
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The text of the rule might permit pretrial establishment only in
specified circumstances, and thereby prevent misuse of the device. Ap-
propriate circumstances would be: at a pretrial conference as presently
provided in Rule 16(c)(1), in response to a motion for judgment as
presently provided in Rule 56(d) or Rule 12,' or in response to an
independent motion made only after the court found the case to be suf-
ficiently complex that such motions should be invited in the interest of
economy and dispatch. Absent such an invitation, or a reasonable basis
for a motion for judgment, a party would have to await a pretrial con-
ference to secure the court's ruling on a proposed establishment of law
or fact. Moreover, the rule could, explicitly, vest discretion in the court
to withhold such rulings when they may be unneeded""' or when the
court perceives that further development is not likely to be fruitful.
Two minor problems pertaining to motions under the present rule
should be addressed. The present ten-day time allowance for motions
under Rule 56(c) is not realistic and seems rarely if ever employed; ten
days is plainly insufficient time to respond to a motion for judgment.
The twenty-day waiting period required by Rule 56(a) is likewise in-
consequential because the period begins to run when the action is filed,
not when the motion is served.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATED PROVISION
A. Relation to Rule 12
Allowing orders establishing law or fact to control further proceed-
ings would have substantial implications for Rule 12 motion practice.
Revisions for Rule 12 should accompany any Rule 56 amendment
along the lines here proposed.
Richard Marcus has commented on the "revival" of practice under
Rule 12.195 He contends that this revival exceeds the role of Rule 12
that the 1938 rulemakers intended.196 For several decades following the
promulgation of the Rules, tension existed between district judges
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c) authorizes a motion for judgment on the pleadings. An
establishment of law could be a useful partial ruling made in response to such a
motion.
194 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d) is mandatory in its language. See Citizens Envtl. Coun-
cil v. Volpe, 364 F. Supp. 286, 290 (D. Kan. 1973). A failure to make such a determi-
nation would appear, however, to be non-reviewable because the issue would be mooted
by trial. See Stewart Title & Trust v. Ordean, 528 F.2d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1976).
195 See Marcus, supra note 73, at 444-51; see also Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice
Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 390 (1980) (suggesting modifica-
tions of standing doctrine).
"" See Marcus, supra note 73, at 437-54.
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steeped in the previous tradition, who persistently granted Rule 12 mo-
tions, and federal appellate courts, who persistently reversed judgments
based on pleading rulings.19 7 The Supreme Court in 1957 gave support
to the prevailing view that pleading is an unsatisfactory basis for judg-
ment and that pleading serves only to provide an adversary with gen-
eral notice regarding the nature of the claim.198 The conventional, in-
deed, the correct, view of the Rules came to be that the appropriate
means of resolving disputes is trial, 99 unless either the parties submit
their case as one raising no factual issues or the apparent evidence so
lacks a basis for trial that summary judgment is appropriate.200 The
1938 objective of reducing the volume of pleading motion practice was
based on long experience with unsuccessful efforts to use pleadings as a
tool for disposition.20 1 Nevertheless, in recent decades, lower federal
courts appear to have entertained Rule 12 motions with increasing fre-
quency, especially in a few substantive classes of cases.
In part, this revival of Rule 12 practice may reflect a tendency that
Charles Clark forecast as a "kind of Gresham's law," by which bad
procedure drives out the good.20 2 In part, it may reflect dissatisfaction
with summary judgment's ineffectiveness as a tool for dealing with un-
founded contentions.203 In part, of course, adversaries use motion prac-
197 See, e.g., Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505, 506-08 (5th
Cir. 1971) (discussing Rules 8(a) and 12(b)); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775
(2d Cir. 1944) (same).
198 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). But cf Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 507 (1978) ("Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal
courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compen-
sable claim for relief under the Federal Constitution, it should not survive a motion to
dismiss.").
11 See Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938);
Kaufman, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pursuit of Justice, in HUGO
BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYMPOSIUM 221 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
200 See 21 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at § 5025.
201 See Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L.
REV. 416, 416 (1921); Marcus, supra note 73, at 437-38.
202 See Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 498 (1950). Judge Clark, for this reason, would
have favored eliminating pleading motion practice altogether. See Smith, supra note
123, at 917-18.
203 For example, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)
cautioned that summary judgment should be used sparingly in antitrust litigation, and
may thereby have stimulated the use of higher pleading standards in that area. See,
e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1110 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 1054 (1985) ("[I]nvocation of antitrust terms of art does not confer
immunity from a motion to dismiss; to the contrary, . . . conclusory statements must be
accompanied by supporting factual allegations."). See generally, Durham & Dibble,
Certification: A Practical Device for Early Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation,
1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (discussing certification as an alternate means of reducing
costly and unnecessary discovery).
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tice to influence the settlement process, or, alas, in some situations, to
increase billable hours on both sides.2 4 In part, more constructively, it
may respond to a reality that some cases can be terminated on the basis
of pleadings, at least if counsel undertakes the professional responsibil-
ity imposed by Rule 11. It is, however, also true that any case properly
terminable on a Rule 12 motion could also be properly terminated
under Rule 56. Professor Marcus has concluded that contemporary
pleading practice "is little better than an expensive waste of time."'205
By affording a more, constructive outlet for the need to make such
rulings, changing Rule 56 invites attention to the possibility of reducing
this waste. One might, indeed, be tempted to reconsider the early Clark
proposal2"6 and simply eliminate subdivision (b)(6) and (c) from Rule
12. Doing so would effectively require that all dispositions be made in
the form of a judgment as a matter of law, without distinction among
those made "on the pleadings," those made on affidavits and other ma-
terial, or those made on account of the absence of such indicia of evi-
dence available for trial.
Less radically, it might be appropriate to authorize the court, on
its own motion, to treat a pleading motion as one addressed to the fac-
tual material as well as the law, and to call on the parties to brief both
legal and factual aspects of the case. This process would enable the
court to order the establishment of law or fact in a complex case at a
sufficiently early stage to achieve significant economies. 0 '
With or without these amendments, the availability of an order
establishing law would present a court ruling on a Rule 12 motion with
an alternative that presumes not to dispose fully of the case, but merely
to shape future proceedings. Such a partial response to a Rule 12 mo-
tion may facilitate settlement and reduce waste in discovery, even if it
does not forthwith dispose of the case.
204 Cf Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal
Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 680, 727-29
(1983) ("The economic incentives for discovery abuse have also been increased by
hourly billing practices.").
205 See Marcus, supra note 73, at 493.
208 See Smith, supra note 123, at 927-28 (noting Clark's proposed elimination of
Rule 12(b)(6)).
207 An additional suggestion to consider is the elimination of only subdivision
(b)(6). The defendant would have the duty to make a timely answer, not to be post-
poned while the motion to dismiss is pending. The court could then have both com-
plaint and answer in sight when deciding whether to rule on the pleadings motions or
whether to enlarge the scope of the inquiry to include factual material.
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B. Relation to Rule 16
As noted, facts and law might be established at a pretrial confer-
ence conducted under Rule 16(c)(1), provided that adequate notice was
given the opposing party. An order embodying establishments of fact or
law could constitute a pretrial order under Rule 16(e).
C. Relation to Rule 36
Factual issues that could be resolved by establishment would often
be better resolved by careful pleading, by stipulation of the parties, or
by means of an admission under Rule 36(a). Indeed, a party should
normally be expected to request, under Rule 36, an admission of an
undisputed fact before proposing that the court establish the fact. A
request for an admission should, however, usually suffice as notice to
the party on whom the request is made that the serving party contends
that the fact is material and not subject to genuine dispute. An estab-
lishment of that fact might thereafter be properly made at a pretrial
conference without further notice to the party served.
The relation between a revised Rule 56 and the present Rule 36
may depend in part on the res judicata effect that would be given to an
establishment of fact. An admission made under Rule 36 is clearly not
preclusive in later litigation," °' whereas an establishment of fact might
be. To the extent that an establishment is preclusive, the revised Rule
56 may give an incentive to admit, thereby enhancing the effectiveness
of Rule 36 as a device to control the making of unfounded assertions.
It is pertinent, therefore, to consider the principles of issue preclu-
sion. We are told that "[o]nce an issue is actually and necessarily deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is con-
clusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving
a party to the prior litigation."20 9 Inasmuch as an establishment of fact
is a determination that the fact cannot be rejected on the basis either of
the evidence or of the probative material available prior to trial, the
established fact appears to have been fully litigated and the party
against whom the determination is made appears to have had "full and
208 See FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b) ("Any admission made by a party under this rule is
for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission for any other pur-
pose nor may it be used against the party in any other proceeding.").
20 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim.").
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fair opportunity to litigate" it.21 ° In this respect, an established fact
resembles a finding of fact made under Rule 52(a).
On the other hand, by traditional principles, an established fact
would not have preclusive effect unless and until it is embodied in a
final judgment of the case. An establishment of fact that is merely in-
terlocutory would lack res judicata effect.211 If that fact later proves to
be immaterial to the disposition of the case or if settlement preempts a
final judgment in the case, there would be no preclusion. Indeed, it
seems clear that later settlement of a case may, by its terms, dispel the
preclusive effect of any antecedent determinations of undisputed
facts.212
Yet strict finality may not be required by contemporary stan-
dards. 213 "As long as the determination was definitive, [an establish-
ment] may be treated as final for purposes of issue preclusion."214 The
factors to be weighed in determining whether an establishment of fact is
sufficiently definitive to be preclusive are the nature of the decision
(i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative), the adequacy of the hearing,
and the opportunity for review.215 Thus, issue preclusion may some-
times be based on an establishment of fact, but an establishment ruling
will not be reliably preclusive in future litigation even between the
same parties.
D. Relation to Rule 50
As noted, a significant relationship between Rule 56 and Rule 50
derives from the similarity between the standard to be applied for es-
tablishing a fact and the standard for directing a verdict or entering a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Some suggestions for reforming
Rule 50216 are connected to the problem of unfounded claims. Consid-
210 Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982).
211 See, e.g., Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Insured Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265, 1269-72
(5th Cir. 1986).
212 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, 756 F.2d 280, 282-84 (2d Cir. 1985). See
generally Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement Conditioned upon the Vaca-
tur of Entered Judgments, 96 YALE L.J. 860 (1987) (arguing that settlement condi-
tioned on vacatur should be prohibited in cases giving rise to the possibility of issue
preclusion against a common plaintiff).
213 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13.
214 See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.9, at
659 (1985); cf. Luben Indus. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1983)
(discussing finality and issue preclusion); Dyndul v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409, 412 (3d
Cir. 1980) (discussing finality); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d
80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961) (listing factors bearing on the preclusive effect of a judgment,
regardless of its finality).
218 Lummus, 297 F.2d. at 89.
211 See, e.g., Ebker v. Tan Jay Int'l, Ltd., 739 F.2d 812, 824 nn.14-15 (2d Cir.
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eration of Rule 56 therefore prompts attention to Rule 50 as well.
The concern with Rule 50 is not that it sends too many or too few
cases to a jury, or that too many or too few verdicts are being disre-
garded at the point of judgment. The concern is rather that Rule 50
and the practice under it are anachronistic, too complex, and a trap for
the unwary.
An old rule of questionable value requires a motion for directed
verdict under Rule 50(a) as a predicate for a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b). The rule rests on the fiction
that denial of a motion for directed verdict automatically reserves the
issue for reconsideration when the post-verdict motion is made. 1'
Courts interpreted a 1913 decision2 8 to require the fiction, but a 1935
holding substantially undermined the 1913 ruling.21 9 Also questionable
is the old rule, possibly abiding, that a party waives a motion for di-
rected verdict by presenting evidence.220
These otherwise anachronistic rules protected opposing parties
from being surprised by a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict based on a legal theory or a factual contention not previously
raised or considered. Absent these provisions, parties might have been
tempted to save an objection to the legal sufficiency of an adversary's
case until it was too late to cure the defect by submission of additional
evidence on a fact not previously recognized by the adversary as
material.22'
On the other hand, requiring a formal motion for directed verdict
has several unfortunate consequences. It is a trap: Failing to make a
timely motion that a judge very likely would have denied could force a
party to undergo a new trial. The refusal to consider a motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict on the sole ground that the party did
not make a motion for directed verdict is an empty formalism out of
keeping with the Rules. Moreover, the requirement forces some parties
to make motions contrary to their own tactical interests; in doubtful
1984) (arguing against the necessity of renewing a motion for directed verdict at the
close of the case).
217 See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 249 (1940).
218 See Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 398-400 (1913) (trial
court may rule with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence and direct a new trial, but
may not determine issues of fact and direct a judgment based thereon).
219 See Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659-61 (1935) (in-
sufficiency of evidence is matter of law, and trial court in such a circumstance may
direct a verdict in defendant's favor).
220 See Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731, 733 (1st Cir. 1954).
221 See, e.g., Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342,
1345-46 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that failure to renew an earlier motion for directed
verdict may unfairly lull the opposing party into believing that a challenge to the suffi-
ciency of evidence has been abandoned).
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cases, litigants may prefer sending their cases to the jury in the hope of
a favorable factual termination rather than risking a reversal of a di-
rected verdict resulting in yet another trial. A number of courts have
used techniques designed to avoid the effect of the requirement222 and
in the process they have created some complex doctrine.223
With the revisions of Rule 56 considered here, there may be ad-
vantage in uniting the terminology of Rules 50 and 56. If the standards
are essentially the same, having one term, judgment as a matter of law,
applicable to all circumstances effects greater clarity. That term might
be the title of a revised Rule 56. This unified device might be employed
at any time after the close of pleadings through the post-trial period
within which a Rule 50 motion must now be made.224
Such a unified device should be applied more cautiously early in a
case when factual material has not been fully developed by discovery.
Caution may diminish as the case proceeds through trial to the point
after trial when a decision would be made whether to enter judgment
as a matter of law on the proof presented at trial despite a contrary
verdict. In this sense, and to this degree, the standard applied would
not be constant through the proceeding. Perhaps this plasticity would
be a source of confusion to counsel, but, on the other hand, the unifica-
tion would focus attention on the central issue of dealing with un-
founded claims: Is the uncertainty created by a contention of a kind
that provides a role for the trier of fact? When that question is an-
swered in the negative, there are benefits, often sizeable, in laying the
contention to rest.
The secondary benefit of unifying Rules 50 and 56 would be the
elimination of the present Rule 50's anachronisms. Because the motion
for judgment as a matter of law would not formally interfere with the
work of the jury, the old Slocum 225 rule, formalistic as it is, would not
defeat a post-verdict judgment even if no pre-judgment motion were
made. 2
26
222 See, e.g., Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 274 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[Tlhis circuit
has allowed something less than a formal motion for directed verdict to preserve a
party's right to move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict."); Sojak v. Hudson
Waterways Corp., 590 F.2d 53, 54-55 (2d Cir. 197.8) (court must review sufficiency of
evidence and order a new trial to prevent manifest injustice or plain error).
223 See generally 9 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at
§ 2537 (reviewing requirements for obtaining judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
224 FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) requires that a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict must be made no later than 10 days after entry of judgment.
225 Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 388 (1913) (court cannot
dispense with a verdict, or disregard one when given, and itself pass on the issues of
fact).
226 Cf. Ebker v. Tan Jay Int'l, Ltd., 739 F.2d 812, 824 nn.14-15 (2d Cir. 1984)
(arguing against the necessity of renewing a motion for directed verdict at the close of
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Further, unification of the two rules would effect new procedural
safeguards bearing on the establishment of facts. Because a judgment as
a matter of law could be entered only if based on established facts, such
judgments could not be entered without notice and opportunity to be
heard. In this way, Rule 56 could perform the functions of the anach-
ronisms of Rule 50 practice, but with greater clarity because direct at-
tention would be given to the problems of notice and opportunity to be
heard.
E. Relation to Rule 59
It would be useful to allow the establishment of law or fact during
or after plenary trial. At those times, establishment would be informed
by the actual evidence presented, not merely by the probative material,
for example, affidavits, available before trial.
Establishing fact or law during trial would abbreviate further pro-
ceedings and thereby achieve economy. Particularly in complex cases, it
may almost never be too late to consider whether further elaboration of
an issue is needed or dispensable.
A post-trial establishment of fact or law may be useful where the
court is exercising its prerogative to order a new trial.227 When a case
has been fully tried, even if mistried, economies may be achieved by
confining retrial to those factual issues perceived as genuine in light of
the first trial. Of course, if an action is not tried to a jury, such an
option is available under the present rules in cases in which the judge is
able to make some findings of fact under Rule 52(a), but even in a case
tried to a jury, the evidence submitted at trial may be sufficiently clear
on some points that some facts could be established under Rule 56 and
thus foreclosed from dispute on re-trial.
F. The Integral Character of the Rules
The demonstrated interrelationship of Rule 56 and other rules
supports another point regarding the possibility of multiple rules 56
applying to different categories of cases defined according to the sub-
stantive rights involved. It is apparent that any significant change in
the case).
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a) provides that a new trial may be granted "on all or part
of the issues." See 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at § 2814
(1971 & Supp. 1988); cf. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494,
499 (1931) (in directing a new trial with respect to damages, the judgment on the main
cause of action need not be disturbed, and the issues on retrial should be restricted to
those left in doubt by both the record and the verdict).
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Rule 56 bears not only on all of the provisions of that rule, but on
others as well, because the steps in a developed procedural system are
interrelated. Early steps in the process rest on anticipation of what is to
come, and later steps clearly flow from preceding ones. It would be
difficult to break out a Rule 56 for antitrust litigation materially differ-
ent from other Rules 56 without breaking apart related Rules 11, 12,
16, 36, 50, and 68. After commencing down a trail to substantive varia-
tions in rules, Congress would find it hard to stop short of complete
differentiation that would seriously complicate federal court practice in
the manner that the common law procedure did.
A parallel point may be made about the substantive law by para-
phrasing Professor Cover:
It is by no means intuitively apparent that within the arena
of antitrust litigation the procedural needs of horizontal re-
straint cases, vertical restraint cases, and merger cases are
sufficiently identical to be usefully encompassed in a single
set of rules which make virtually no distinction among such
cases in terms of available process.22
It is perhaps no more to say than that law is seamless, yet the point is
worth making here. Once differentiated procedure is made stylish, there
is no reason not to distinguish between such subtleties as the various
forms of antitrust or of assumpsit, and it is safe to suppose that the
various involved interest groups would find reasons to argue for such
distinctions.
G. Substantive Variation
Let us then reconsider the concept of civil procedure divided ac-
cording to the substantive nature of the dispute at hand. Assuming, as I
think we must, that the Article III rulemaking process is unfit to pro-
pose multiple Rules 56, should Congress nevertheless seriously *consider
devising them, or creating some other agency to devise them?
One way to test further is to imagine that the draft rule presented
as Appendix 1 to this article is proposed for adoption by Congress as a
rule to be applied only in consumer protection cases or only in securi-
ties fraud cases. Perhaps then one could envision a robust debate be-
tween consumer advocates and manufacturers, or between the securities
industry and investors, over the text of their special Rule 56.
Until we have actually heard such a debate, it is premature to say,
categorically, that no special considerations indicate that Rule 56
228 Cf supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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should be written differently to meet the needs of such disputants. One
can anticipate, however, that consumers and manufacturers, or brokers
and investors, would not be of one mind on what the rule applied to
them should be.
In what kind of forum should such a matter be resolved? If not in
a Committee of the Judicial Conference, would a legislative committee
welcome the task, or would it seek to delegate to a drafting committee,
or to the Department of Justice? Creating an appropriate drafting
group of consumers and manufacturers, or of brokers and investors,
would be an uncertain task requiring much political energy.
Indeed, considering the difficulty even of devising a process to de-
velop a procedural system for their particular class of cases, consumers
and manufacturers or brokers and investors might well unite only in
the choice to have their cases decided in accordance with "general"
rules of procedure applicable to all and crafted to guide judges to be as
wise as they can be. In doing so, they would but act on a truth discov-
ered long ago by Bentham and Brougham and Field and Pound and
Clark and many others, one celebrated by Weber, but not always
remembered.
H. Other Variations
Just because the present structure of both the rules and the
rulemaking process precludes major divisions of the rules on the basis
of substantive law does not mean that Rule 56 in its present or future
form is either inflexible or incapable of adjustment to recognize differ-
ences in litigation situations.229 It may well be that some cases should
be handled differently with respect to the disposition of manifestly un-
founded claims because of the low stakes involved.2"' Perhaps adjust-
ment should be made for weaker litigants, especially those appearing
pro se.231 Perhaps adjustment should made as well for cases subject to a
2 Thus, the Supreme Court once suggested that Rule 56 should be used with
special caution in complex antitrust litigation. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). See generally 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
56.17 (2d ed. 1982) (examining the grant or denial of summary judgment in a vari-
ety of different actions and concluding that the same basic principles apply to all types
of claims).
'3 "Cadillac-style procedures are not needed to process bicycle-size lawsuits, yet
that is what the rules often appear to require." Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 247.
2.1 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C § 1915 (1982); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(b)(i). See generally
Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1270 (1966) (re-
viewing federal statutes and decisions relating to the plight of the indigent civil liti-
gant); Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1923) (discuss-
ing English rules regarding representation for poor persons and suggesting reforms in




This last adjustment may have special promise as a means of deal-
ing with some immediate concerns. It is, however, a difficult problem.
In providing for fee-shifting, Congress has singled out certain classes of
plaintiffs for especially favorable treatment in order to encourage their
suits. On the other hand, the fact of such legislation could possibly af-
fect the frequency with which manifestly unfounded contentions are
made; conversely, the apparent possibility of over-contending may cause
judges to be especially mistrustful of contentions made with resulting
over-reaction in disposing of them. One may perhaps therefore reasona-
bly argue that screening devices such as Rule 56 should operate with
greater or less effect in fee-shifted cases. Whether there may be merit
in a different procedure for cases subject to fee-shifting is, however,
beyond the compass of this article.
VI. CONCLUSION
The aims of any revision of Rule 56 are already stated in Rule 1.
No assurance, however, can be given that any amendment, past or pre-
sent, will effect the intended benefit or avoid unintended cost.233 Law
reformers should always remember the famous dictum, widely attrib-
uted, that things are bad enough without reform; they should be careful
to practice the medical injunction: First, do no harm.
cial barriers).
232 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). For a compilation of statutes, see Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 260 n.33 (1975). See also Note,
State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321 (1984) (giving historical and descriptive survey of
state fee-shifting statutes). See generally Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee
Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 (1982) (identifying six rationales
for fee-shifting and discussing the merits of each).
233 Cf. Risinger, supra note 33, at 36 n.5.
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APPENDIX 1: REVISED RULE PROPOSAL
Rule 56. Judgment as a Matter of Law; Establishment of Fact and
Law
(a) Judgment on Established Law and Facts
On motion, the court shall render judgment with respect to any claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim, if it finds that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on established facts. In rendering such a
judgment, the court shall establish the law and the material facts in
conformity with subdivisions (d) and (e).
(b) Motion for Judgment and Response
(1) A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any
time not later than 10 days after entry of judgment as prescribed in
Rule 58, and shall specify the judgment sought, the law and the facts
on which the moving party is entitled to judgment, and the basis on
which the material facts can be established under subdivision (e) of this
rule. If the motion is made before trial, the motion shall be accompa-
nied by any supporting material authorized by paragraph (e)(4) that
the proponent can supply.
(2) The opposing party shall be allowed 30 days in which to file
and serve a memorandum in opposition accompanied by any supporting
material that the opponent can supply, and specifying those issues pre-
viously identified by the moving party as suited to establishment under
subdivision (e) on which the opposing party intends to present evidence.
The opponent may also make a cross-motion. If the opposing party
makes a response, the proponent shall be allowed 10 days for reply
before any ruling on the motion or cross-motion is made. For good
cause, the court may with notice shorten the times for response and
reply.
(c) Motion and Order to Establish Law or Facts to Control Fur-
ther Proceedings
To secure the speedy, just, and inexpensive determination of an action,
the court may at any time after the close of the pleadings establish law
or facts to control further proceedings and to be applied in the final
decision on a claim, counterclaim, or defense. An order of establishment
shall be in writing and signed by the court. Such an order may be made
(1) at or after trial,
(2) at a pretrial conference conducted under Rule 16,
(3) in response to a motion for judgment under paragraph (b)(6)
or subdivision (c) of Rule 12,
(4) in response to a motion for judgment pursuant to subdivision
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(a) of this rule, or
(5) in response to a motion invited by the court upon a finding
that the case is so complex that economy and dispatch will be served by
the entertainment of such motions.
(d) Establishment of Law
An establishment of the law controlling the action shall bind all parties
having an opportunity to present timely legal argument to the court
with respect to the law establishing, and shall be modified only to avoid
error of law.
(e) Establishment of Fact
(1) A fact may be established only if there is no evidentiary basis
for a reasonable trier of fact to reject it.
(2) No establishment of fact shall be made over the objection of a
party who has not
(A) been a party to the action for at least 45 days.
(B) received notice, at least 30 days prior to action by the court, of
the contention that the fact is material and cannot be rejected by a rea-
sonable trier of fact, and
(C) had a reasonable opportunity to discover evidence that would
enable a reasonable trier of fact to find contrary to the fact to be
established.
For good cause stated, the court may extend or shorten the time limita-
tions stated in subparagraphs (e)(2)(A) or (e)(2)(B).
(3) An establishment of fact shall be supported by explicit refer-
ence to
(A) a pleading or other admission of the fact by the party con-
testing the establishment of that fact,
(B) an affidavit or declaration, as provided in paragraph (e)(4) of
this rule, that reveals evidence that will be available for trial and that
cannot be effectively contested,
(C) the absence of any affidavit or declaration, as provided in par-
agraph (e)(4) of this rule or other material available to the parties, that
indicates probative evidence that could be presented at trial by the
party bearing the burden of producing evidence of that fact at trial,. (D) evidence presented at trial which was not genuinely contested,
or
(E) an absence of probative evidence presented at trial by the
party bearing the burden of production of evidence with respect to that
fact.
(4) An affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury signed in
the form authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1746 may be sufficient to support
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an establishment of fact under subparagraph (e)(3)(B) or to resist an
establishment of fact under subparagraph (e)(3)(C) if it is based on
personal knowledge, sets forth facts that would be admissible in evi-
dence, and shows affirmatively that the affiant or declarant is compe-
tent to testify to the matters stated therein. If facts referred to in an
affidavit or declaration are contained in another document, a copy of
the document or the relevant excerpt shall be attached and the affidavit
or declaration shall contain a specific reference to the document and the
location therein where any such excerpt can be found. Voluminous doc-
uments need not be attached to the affidavit or declaration and may be
presented in the form of a verified chart, summary or calculation, pro-
vided that such documents are available for review by the parties and
the court; voluminous documents shall be produced if the court so or-
ders. An affidavit or declaration may be supplemented by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions, and pleadings, but a party op-
posing an establishment of fact may not rely upon that party's own
pleading to show that there is a genuine dispute.
(5) An establishment of fact shall be treated as a ruling on a ques-
tion of law, and shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice.
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APPENDIX 2: PROCESS OF RULEMAKING
The public, the general bar, and even litigators whose work is in-
extricably involved with the product rarely see the work of the Com-
mittee that initiates revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Yet, while the Committee has worked quietly, it has never avoided the
attentions of those interested in that work.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (the "Civil Rules Com-
mittee") is a creature of the Judicial Conference of the United States. It
is a descendant' of the Advisory Committee that was appointed by the
Court in 1935,2 and that reported directly to the Supreme Court. The
ancestral committee drafted the 1938 rules, and the present committee
sits continuously to refurbish that work in light of changing
circumstances.
Placing the rulemaking function under the Judicial Conference
created a significant change in the composition of the Advisory Com-
mittee. The original Advisory Committee included only lawyers and
law professors; Judicial Conference committees are comprised mainly
of judges. The present membership of the Committee includes one
United States Magistrate, three circuit judges, four district judges, one
state court judge,' a representative of the Justice Department, two pri-
vate lawyers, and two law professors. Committee members serve for
three year terms,4 and turnover on the committee is substantial; four
persons have chaired the committee in the last five years.5
The Civil Rules Committee progresses at a very deliberate speed
because of the layered review of its efforts. Even for the most technical
of amendments, rulemaking usually requires at least three years.6
Amendments are reviewed by a significant number of interested profes-
1 There was no Committee from 1956 to 1959: the Committee advising the Court
was discharged by the Court on October 1, 1956. Order Discharging the Advisory
Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956). The advisory function was re-established in the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States by Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72
Stat. 356, whereupon a committee to advise the Judicial Conference was promptly es-
tablished. 1958 JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. ANN. REP. 6.
2 Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules,
295 U.S. 774 (1935).
' State court judges are appointed to the Advisory Committee in recognition of the
potential effect of Rules amendments on state courts. See McKusick, State Courts' In-
terest in Federal Rulemaking: A Proposal for Recognition, 36 ME. L. Rav. 253, 256
(1984).
4 The short term is an innovation of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1986.
Judge Walter R. Mansfield (1977-1985), Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. (1985-
86), Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr. (1986-87), Judge John F. Grady (1987-date).
8 In contrast, only two years passed from the initial Advisory Committee's ap-
pointment and its transmission to the Supreme Court of a completed draft. See C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 404 (4th ed. 1983).
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sionals and professional groups, and by five groups that play official
roles in approving amendments before they become law.
The Civil Rules Committee meets twice a year at publicly an-
nounced times and places;' financial constraints preclude meeting more
frequently. Committee meetings are now open,8 but sparingly attended
by non-members.
Rules amendments commence with suggestions, generally submit-
ted by judges, lawyers, bar organizations, or law professors. One pro-
posal from a United States Senator and one from a member of the
House of Representatives have been studied in 1988.' In recent years,
the Department of Justice has urged amendments to lighten the finan-
cial burdens of the United States Marshals Service."0 In 1988, about
thirty possible amendments were in various stages of consideration,1"
each initiated by a suggestion coming from outside the committee.
The Civil Rules Committee considers every suggestion made di-
rectly to it,'2 and the Reporter reviews the published literature for ad-
ditional suggestions. Manifestly unsound suggestions are peremptorily
discarded, and suggestions inappropriate for consideration under the
Rules Enabling Act are either discarded"3 or, occasionally, referred to
Congress. 4
The Committee is most likely to defer a suggestion for later con-
sideration if the suggestion pertains to a rule that has recently been
amended; packaging groups of amendments for presentation every sev-
eral years facilitates public comment and discussion of proposals, and
lightens the burdens on lawyers and judges who must observe rule
changes. The Committee's current agenda of matters under active con-
sideration is sufficiently large that new proposals, if not urgent, are
likely to be retained for study in connection with a later round of
' Effective publication of the time and place is a problem. The information is
available through the Federal Register or by inquiry at the Judicial Conference.
8 The first open meeting was held in 1986; a requirement of open meetings is a
feature of the Rules Enabling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648, 4649
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (1982)).
' One of these was enacted by Congress as a rider to the Drug Bill of October 25,
1988. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
"0 See Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serv-
ing Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1198 (1987).
11 The Committee has seen in 1987 or 1988 draft amendments on Rules 4, 5, 6,
12, 15, 16, 26, 30, 35, 40, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 56, 63, 64, 65, 69, 72, 77, and 84, and
Admiralty Rules C and E.
1 Interested persons can communicate with the Committee through the Reporter
or by addressing it at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
13 See Carrington, The Rules Enabling Act of 1988: Original Sin Resisted, 1989
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming).
14 Most recently, this was the action taken in response to proposals from the




The Civil Rules Committee strives to relate proposed amendments
to the text of the rule directly involved, to other provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, and to pertinent provisions of the Judi-
cial Code. In considering amendments, the Committee has access to the
services of the Federal Judicial Center,15 which can sometimes provide
the illumination of empirical study. Some of the Center's work is pub-
lished. 6 The Committee, through the Reporter, also strives to use the
substantial body of professional and academic writing about the
Rules. "
The Reporter prepares drafts of possible amendments with pro-
posed Advisory Committee notes. These then circulate, often before
they are considered by the Committee, to law professors known to have
particular interest in them." They also circulate to bar organizations
maintaining an active interest in judicial law reform and manifesting a
willingness to devote professional energy to the study of proposals. The
Reporter carries on a significant correspondence with scholars, judges,
and lawyers having an interest in the effectiveness of federal civil proce-
18 See 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1982).
'e The Center's published works include: R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE
ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW (Federal Judicial Center 1980); J.
BROWNING, C. SEITZ & C. CLARK, ILLUSTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS
OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY (Federal Judicial Center 1986); P. CON-
NOLLY & R. LUMBARD, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS:
MOTIONS (Federal Judicial Center 1980); S. OLSON, CALENDARING PRACTICES OF
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA (Federal Judicial Center 1987); R.
RHODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Federal Judicial Center 1981); T. WILLGING,
TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION (Federal Judicial Center 1987); T. WILLGING, As-
BESTOS CASE MANAGEMENT: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES (Federal Judicial
Center 1985).
17 The Committee has recently used Brussack, Outrageous Fortune, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 671 (1988) and Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its
Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507 (1987).
18 This process sometimes leads to premature comment. The concluding pages of
Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 187-
193 (1988) attack "the response" of the Civil Rules Committee to recent Supreme
Court cases. There had been to date no response at all. Professor Stempel had access to
an earlier draft of some imagined rule revisions prepared by the Reporter to evoke
helpful comments from those known to be interested in the subject. That draft was
briefly discussed by the Committee in early 1987, and again briefly in late 1988, but
action with respect to Rule 56 has yet not been the subject of serious discussion by the
Committee. Meanwhile, another imagined revision of Rule 56, based on much advice
and criticism, is appended to this article. Only in April, 1989, did the Committee take
an active interest in the rule. It then recommended to the Standing Committee that a
draft similar to, but different from, that set forth in Appendix 1 be published for com-
ment by the bench and bar. No action has been taken on the recommendation at the
time of publication.
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dure or in procedural justice. Rarely does a received communication
identify a constituent group by the substantive nature of its claims or
defenses.
If a proposal receives tentative approval of the Civil Rules Com-
mittee, it is next presented to the Standing Committee on Rules. The
Standing Committee meets twice a year to hear recommendations from
its several advisory committees.' 9 Its composition is similar to that of
the subordinate Civil Rules Committee, differing only in that Standing
Committee members are generally veterans of one of the several
subordinate committees. The Standing Committee often remands, with
suggestions, recommendations of an advisory committee for further
consideration.
With tentative approval from the Standing Committee, proposed
amendments to the Civil Rules are published for comment.20 Hearings
are announced and held, generally in several cities. 2 A plan to conduct
such hearings, when feasible, at the time and place of professional
meetings (e.g., those of the American Bar Association Section on Litiga-
tion, the Association of American Law Schools Section on Civil Proce-
dure, and the American College of Trial Lawyers) is being considered.
After hearings, the Civil Rules Committee reconsiders its recommenda-
tions in light of comments received. Substantial change will require a
new set of comments and hearings. A recommendation is then sent to
the Standing Committee for final approval.
If the Standing Committee approves, a proposed amendment is
forwarded to the Judicial Conference of the United States for its ap-
proval.2 If the Judicial Conference approves, the proposal is transmit-
ted to the Supreme Court for promulgation.2" So far, the Supreme
Court has promulgated every rule change recommended to it by the
Civil Rules Committee and the Judicial Conference, although not al-
ways without dissent. Justices Black and Douglas were especially regu-
lar in their dissents.24
19 Proceedings of the annual Judicial Conference (published annually).
20 The first publication of proposed amendments appears in Report of Proposed
-Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 433 (1946); subsequent proposals
have been routinely circulated as inserts to West Publishing Company advance sheets
for the Federal Reporter, the Federal Supplement, and the Federal Rules Decisions.
21 This practice was established in 1984.
22 28 U. S. C. § 331: "The Conference shall also carry on a continuous study of
the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter
in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other courts of the United States
pursuant to law."
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
24 See Order of April 29, 1980, 446 U.S. 997 (Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist,
JJ. dissenting from 1980 amendments); Order of March 1, 1971, 401 U.S. 1019 (Black
and Douglas, JJ. dissenting from 1971 amendments); Order of March 30, 1970, 398
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Amendments are not effective until they have remained "on the
table" of Congress for a prescribed period.2" This period permits Con-
gressional oversight, which constrains the making of rules having ad-
verse effects on groups identified by their substantive stakes in litiga-
tion. Such groups are given at least six months in which to arouse
Congressional interest in a rule they regard as adverse.26 This oversight
function could be perceived as a denigration of the status of courts,
especially inasmuch as the rules are promulgated by the Supreme
Court, the head of a branch of government having constitutional status
equal to that of Congress. That rules of court supersede procedural
provisions of earlier legislation,27  however, may justify the
arrangement.
In 1982, Congress rejected, for the first time, a recommendation
from the Civil Rules Committee28 and enacted its own proposal for an
amendment to Rule 4.29 Individual Senators and Congressmen have
sponsored bills to effect other changes; this sort of activity may be in-
creasing. In 1988, the "drug bill" was enacted with a rider that
amended Rule 35 to allow courts to order mandatory mental examina-
tions by clinical psychologists. 30 This is the only instance in fifty years
in which Congress has acted wholly on its own to amend a Civil
U.S. 979 (Black and Douglas, JJ. dissenting from 1970 amendments); Order of Febru-
ary 28, 1966, 383 U.S. 1089 (Douglas, J. dissenting in part from 1966 amendments);
Order of January 21, 1963, 374 U.S. 865, 870 (Black and Douglas, JJ. joining in
dissent from 1963 amendments, and recommending that responsibility be transferred
from the Court to the Judicial Conference); Order of April 17, 1961, 368 U.S. 1012
(Black and Douglas, JJ. separately dissenting from 1961 amendments); Order of De-
cember 28, 1939, 308 U.S. 642, 643 (Black, J. dissenting from 1940 amendment to the
effective date provision); Order of December 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783 (Brandeis, J.
dissenting from 1938 promulgation of the Rules).
25 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1982) now provides that the Court "shall transmit to the
Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule . . . is to become effective a
copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1
.... " Rules Enabling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648, 4649.
28 Such Congressional oversight is not imposed on administrative agency rules,
many of which have greater substantive portent than rules of judicial procedure.
2 "All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect." 28 U.S.C. 2074. This provision has seldom been applied
and is limited in its scope by the requirement that rules be "procedural," a term likely
to be given a restricted meaning in the circumstance of any application of the superses-
sion provision. See generally Carrington, supra note 13.
28 Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246 (eff. Aug. 1, 1982). The
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, disapproved by Congress in 1972, were originated
by a committee on Evidence Rules.
29 Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (eff. Feb. 26, 1983).
See Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Eff. Feb. 26,
1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 88, 88 (1983).
" Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4401.
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Rule. 1 More frequently, Congress has simply acquiesced in the pro-
mulgation of Civil Rules amendments. This passivity partly reflects a
benevolent Congressional self-restraint; Congress has the unquestioned
power to dissolve not only the rulemaking apparatus, but also the fed-
eral courts themselves.3 2
"' Such legislative incursions are more frequent with respect to amendment of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 410.
32 Federal courts other than the Supreme Court are established under Article III
of the Constitution and can therefore be substantially controlled by Congress. See Ex
Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 513 (1868). See generally Hart, The Power of Congress
to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 1362 (1953) (discussing the validity of Congressionally-imposed limits on federal
courts' jurisdiction); Van Alstyne, Legislation to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 96 F.R.D. 275 (1983) (same). For an opposing view, see Wigmore, Legislature
Has No Power in Procedural Field, 20 J. AM. JUDIC. Soc'Y 159, 159 (1936) (arguing
"that the legislature (federal or state) exceeds its constitutional power when it attempts
to impose upon the judiciary any rules for the dispatch of the judiciary's duties").
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